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Povzetek
Naslov: Zdruzˇevanje vecˇmodalne informacije in cˇezmodalno ucˇenje v umet-
nih spoznavnih sistemih
Cˇezmodalno povezovanje je zdruzˇevanje dveh ali vecˇ modalnih predstavitev
lastnosti neke entitete v skupno predstavitev. Gre za eno temeljnih lastnosti
spoznavnih sistemov, ki delujejo v kompleksnem okolju. Da bi se spoznavni
sistemi uspesˇno prilagajali spremembam v dinamicˇnem okolju, je potrebno
mehanizem cˇezmodalnega povezovanja nadgraditi s cˇezmodalnim ucˇenjem.
Morebiti sˇe najtezˇja naloga pa je integracija obeh mehanizmov v spoznavni
sistem. Njuna vloga v takem sistemu je dvojna: premosˇcˇanje semanticˇnih
vrzeli med modalnostmi ter mediacija med nizˇjenivojskimi mehanizmi za
obelavo senzorskih podatkov in viˇsjenivojskimi spoznavnimi procesi, kot sta
npr. motivacija in nacˇrtovanje.
V magistrski nalogi predstavljamo pristop k modeliranju verjetnostnega
vecˇmodalnega zdruzˇevanja informacij v spoznavnih sistemih. S pomocˇjo mar-
kovskih logicˇnih omrezˇij formuliramo model cˇezmodalnega povezovanja in
ucˇenja ter opiˇsemo nacˇela njegovega vkljucˇevanja v spoznavne arhitekture.
Prototip modela smo ovrednotili samostojno, z eksperimenti, ki simulirajo
trimodalno spoznavno arhitekturo. Na podlagi nasˇega pristopa oblikujemo,
implementiramo in integriramo tudi podsistem prepricˇanj, ki premosˇcˇa se-
manticˇni prepad v prototipu spoznavnega sistema George. George je in-
teligenten robot, ki je sposoben zaznavanja in prepoznavanja predmetov iz
okolice ter ucˇenja njihovih lastnosti s pomocˇjo pogovora s cˇlovekom. Njegov
poglavitni namen je preizkus razlicˇnih paradigem o interaktivnemu ucˇenju
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konceptov. V ta namen smo izdelali in izvedli interaktivne eksperimente
za vrednotenje Georgevih vedenjskih mehanizmov. S temi eksperimenti smo
nasˇ pristop k vecˇmodalnemu zdruzˇevanju informacij preizkusili in ovrednotili
tudi kot del delujocˇega spoznavnega sistema.
Kljucˇne besede: cˇezmodalno povezovanje, cˇezmodalno ucˇenje, spoznavni
sistemi, iteligentni roboti, markovska logicˇna omrezˇja, strojno ucˇenje, umetna
inteligenca.
Abstract
Title: Merging Multi-Modal Information and Cross-Modal Learning in Ar-
tificial Cognitive Systems
Cross-modal binding is the ability to merge two or more modal represen-
tations of the same entity into a single shared representation. This ability
is one of the fundamental properties of any cognitive system operating in
a complex environment. In order to adapt successfully to changes in a dy-
namic environment the binding mechanism has to be supplemented with
cross-modal learning. But perhaps the most difficult task is the integration
of both mechanisms into a cognitive system. Their role in such a system
is two-fold: to bridge the semantic gap between modalities, and to mediate
between the lower-level mechanisms for processing the sensory data, and the
higher-level cognitive processes, such as motivation and planning.
In this master thesis, we present an approach to probabilistic merging of
multi-modal information in cognitive systems. By this approach, we formu-
late a model of binding and cross-modal learning in Markov logic networks,
and describe the principles of its integration into a cognitive architecture. We
implement a prototype of the model and evaluate it with off-line experiments
that simulate a cognitive architecture with three modalities. Based on our
approach, we design, implement and integrate the belief layer – a subsystem
that bridges the semantic gap in a prototype cognitive system named George.
George is an intelligent robot that is able to detect and recognise objects in
its surroundings, and learn about their properties in a situated dialogue with
a human tutor. Its main purpose is to validate various paradigms of in-
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teractive learning. To this end, we have developed and performed on-line
experiments that evaluate the mechanisms of robot’s behaviour. With these
experiments, we were also able to test and evaluate our approach to merging
multi-modal information as part of a functional cognitive system.
Keywords: binding, cross-modal learning, cognitive systems, intelligent
robots, Markov logic networks, machine learning, artificial intelligence.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Cognitive systems can be best described as systems able of understanding
information in order to make informed decisions. To do that, they have to be
capable of performing specific cognitive operations, like analysing, relating,
deciding, planning, etc. An artificial cognitive system operating in a real
world environment must be able to collect relevant information about its
surroundings, understand it, and make autonomous decisions or plans about
its activities within the same environment. In general, the information about
the environment can be collected in two ways: (i) by interpreting data from
sensors, i.e. by perception, or (ii) by interpreting information from another
agent, if the system is capable of communication with him.
Perception is, of course, the more direct and efficient of the two ways.
It involves transforming the sensory data into a suitable and usually more
general representation that can be used by complex cognitive mechanisms
(we say that such representations are grounded in system’s sensory input).
In this process, the system relies on its conceptual knowledge about the
environment. Perception is therefore a cognitive process that merges sensory
data from the environment with conceptual information that is part of the
system knowledge.
Since a cognitive system can have multiple types of sensors, each of them
with its own characteristics and specifics, a very important part of its cogni-
1
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tion is the ability to merge representations from multiple sources (in this work
we call them modalities) into a unified representation (in other words, merg-
ing different kinds of perceptions of the same thing into a single notion). A
specific type of knowledge that allows the system to relate information from
different modalities is needed for such a process. We call such knowledge the
cross-modal knowledge.
When a cognitive system operates in an ever-changing, dynamic envi-
ronment, its ability to adapt to changes in such environment becomes vital.
This ability translates to various cognitive mechanisms that allow the system
to continuously update its knowledge, accommodating new concepts, or just
adapting the old ones. All these mechanisms, of course, involve learning,
either to improve perceptive abilities of the system, or to increase its ability
to associate between different kinds of perceptions, i.e. cross-modal learn-
ing. However, to be able to learn something, there must be first a learning
opportunity. Therefore, a cognitive system should also incorporate mecha-
nisms of motivation and behaviour that actively seek such opportunities (e.g.
searching for a peculiar item with rare properties).
The pursuit of knowledge becomes more varied, if we add another agent
to the environment (e.g. a human), and make the system able to commu-
nicate with him. The system can exploit the dialogue with the agent to
supplement its perception of the environment, e.g. to obtain information
about an item that its perception alone can not. Such situations also create
learning opportunities. The system can also actively strive to improve its
conceptual knowledge, e.g. by deliberately engaging in conversation about
a certain concept. However, even in such an environment, the ability to
improve autonomously its knowledge is still useful to a cognitive system,
although, learning is usually more efficient, when a supervisor is involved.
Situated and non-situated dialogue with another agent and related cog-
nitive mechanisms require yet more sophistication from the cognitive layers
that merge multi-sourced information. Besides multi-modal information, the
system must also manage multi-agent information. Many aspects of these
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two problems are very related, especially, if the system has to deal with one
agent, only (in this thesis, we will sometimes treat multi-agent information
as multi-modal). However, with the increased autonomy and competencies
of the cognitive system, widens also the potential knowledge gap between the
system and other agents. Thus, managing multi-agent information becomes
also an epistemic problem.
1.1 Goals and Methods
The focus of this thesis is on cognitive processes that relate and merge in-
formation from different sources, in order to produce unified representations
that can be used by higher-level cognition. They represent a crucial part
of any cognitive system operating in a realistic environment. Our aim is
to define a paradigm about such processes, develop a method based on this
paradigm, implement a prototype of the method, and evaluate the prototype
both off-line and as part of a real cognitive system (i.e. a robot operating in
a real world environment). The paradigm, the method and the implementa-
tion must also include mechanisms for adapting and improving the knowledge
that is used for merging information.
We assume an open and uncertain environment, where the system has
to be always ready to cope with uncertainty in its perceptions, as well as
acknowledge new concepts. This implies a probabilistic approach to mod-
elling internal representations, and consequently probabilistic methods for
merging multi-modal information and learning. The methods must be capa-
ble of probabilistic modelling of conceptual knowledge that is continuously
accumulated, and of forming integrated probabilistic representation of the
environment that the system is currently aware of (i.e. perceptions).
Our aim is also to develop an approach to integration of our method
into a prototype robot. This will allow us to evaluate our paradigm as part
of a real cognitive system, and see how it works in conjunction with other
cognitive processes that typically make a cognitive system functional (e.g.
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Figure 1.1: George in an early development stage.
situated dialogue, motivation, planning, etc.).
1.2 Contributions
The probabilistic model of binding and cross-modal learning, its formulation
in MLN and the approach to its integration into a cognitive system represent
the core of this thesis and its main contributions. This work was published
in [44].
The robot George, which we use as the evaluation platform for our meth-
ods and approaches, is the result of a joint effort of six partners within the
FP7 European project CogX : University of Birmingham (UK), DFKI (Ger-
many), KTH Stockholm (Sweden), University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Alfred
Ludwig University of Freiburg (Germany) and TU Wien (Austria). The au-
thor of this thesis made several contributions to this research. Besides the
belief layer and the reference resolution, he contributed to the visual at-
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tention mechanism, the attentive part of the visual subsystem (2D object
segmentation) and the system integration in general. He also made many
other technical contributions, e.g. the robotic arm integration, the pan-tilt
unit integration, etc. The description of George that we provide in this thesis
is a digest of [39].
Another important contribution of this work are the belief layer and the
mechanism for reference resolution in George. They represent the embodi-
ment of our core ideas and methods within a realistic context. The author of
this thesis made most of this research in collaboration with Miroslav Jan´ıcˇek
from DFKI (Germany) [43].
The mentor of this thesis and the author of this thesis designed together
the experiments for evaluation of George’s behaviour. The experiments were
performed by the author of this thesis.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. In the next chapter, we present the
paradigm of binding that underlies our approach. We first define the problem
that we aim to solve, then we describe our method and its implementation.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to George, a prototype of a cognitive system that
represents the platform for evaluation of our approaches and methods. In
Chapter 4, we describe in more detail the belief layer of George. The belief
layer is a vital part of George that bridges the semantic gap between its
lower and higher cognition. The belief layer is the result of our efforts to
integrate our approach and methods into George. In Chapter 5, we present
two sets of experiments: (i) the off-line experiments on the prototype binding
mechanism from Chapter 2, and (ii) the experiments performed on George
prototype. Finally, we conclude with Chapter 6, where we summarize this
thesis and express our final remarks.
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Chapter 2
Binding and Cross-modal
Learning
One of the most important abilities of any cognitive system operating in
a real world environment is to relate and merge information from different
modalities. For example, when hearing a sudden, unexpected sound, humans
automatically try to locate visually its source in order to relate the audio
perception of the sound to the visual perception of the source. The process of
combining two or more modal representations1 (grounded in different sensory
inputs) of the same entity into a single multi-modal representation is called
binding. While the term binding has many different meanings across various
scientific fields, a very similar definition comes from neuroscience, where it
denotes the ability of the brain to converge perceptual data processed in
different brain parts and segregate it into distinct elements [2, 36].
The binding process can operate on different types and levels of cues. In
the example above, the direction that the human perceives the sound from
is an important cue, but sometimes this is not enough. If there are several
1 In the literature, the term modality typically refers to a sensory modality, also known
as stimulus modality. A modal representation is a collection of information about a phys-
ical entity based on a particular sensory input, for example visual, auditory, olfactory, or
kinaesthetic information. We adopt here a notion of modality that includes both sensory
data, and further interpretations of that data within the modality [38].
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potential sound sources in the direction of the percept, the human may have
to relate higher-level audio and visual properties. A knowledge base that
associates the higher-level perceptual features across different modalities is
therefore critical for a successful binding process in any cognitive system.
In order to function properly in a dynamic environment, a cognitive sys-
tem should also be able to learn and adapt in a continuous, open-ended
manner. The ability to update the cross-modal knowledge base on-line, i.e.
cross-modal learning is therefore vital for any kind of binding process in such
an environment.
Many of the past attempts at binding information within cognitive sys-
tems were restricted to associating linguistic information to lower level per-
ceptual information. Roy et al. tried to ground the linguistic descriptions
of objects and actions in visual and sound perceptions and to generate de-
scriptions of previously unseen scenes based on the accumulated knowledge
[34, 35]. This is essentially a symbol grounding problem first defined by Har-
nad [15]. Chella et al. proposed a three-layered cognitive architecture around
the visual system with the middle, conceptual layer bridging the gap between
linguistic and sub-symbolic (visual) layers [7]. Related problems were also
often addressed by Steels [40].
Jacobsson et al. approached the binding problem in a more general way
[21, 20] developing a cross-modal binding system that could form associations
between multiple modalities and could be part of a wider cognitive architec-
ture. They modelled the cross-modal knowledge as a set of binary functions
comparing binding attributes in a pairwise fashion. A cognitive architecture
using this system for linguistic reference resolution was presented in [45].
This system was capable of learning visual concepts in interaction with a hu-
man tutor. Later, the same group developed a probabilistic binding system
that encoded cross-modal knowledge into a Bayesian graphical model [46].
In [27] a framework for constructing higher-level cognitive representations of
the environment, called beliefs, was presented. Markov logic was used as the
main framework for various types of inference over beliefs, including percep-
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tual grouping, which comes very close to our definition of binding. All these
systems assumed static cross-modal knowledge.
Our aim is to develop a flexible binding system, capable to adapt con-
tinuously its probabilistic representation of cross-modal knowledge to the
challenges of a dynamic environment. These requirements lead us in the di-
rection of Markov graphical models as a powerful and flexible platform for
probabilistic problem formulation. Unlike previous binding systems, the sys-
tem presented here is able to learn cross-modal associations in a continuous
manner. As a basis for our work, we also introduce a formal definition of
the binding problem, which is still general enough to accommodate other
possible approaches to binding.
This chapter is organised as follows: in the next section, we formally
define the problems of cross-modal learning and binding. In Section 2.2, we
first briefly describe the basics of Markov logic networks (MLN). Then we
describe our binding and cross-modal learning model that is based on MLN
and, in Section 2.3, discuss its integration in a cognitive architecture.
In order to validate our approach, we dedicate the first part of Chapter
5 (Section 5.1) to the experiments performed on an off-line binding system,
designed according to the methods described in this chapter.
2.1 Problem Definition
The main idea of cross-modal learning is to use successful bindings of modal
percepts as learning samples for the cross-modal learner. The improved cross-
modal knowledge thus enhances the power of the binding process, which is
then able to bind together new combinations of percepts, i.e. new learn-
ing samples for the learner. For example, if a cognitive system is currently
capable of binding an utterance describing something blue and round to a
perceived blue ball only by colour association, this particular instance of
binding could teach the system to associate also the perceived visual shape
of the ball to the linguistic concept of roundness. We see that at least on this
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level the binding process depends on the ability to associate between modal
features (in this example the perceived colour and the perceived shape are
features of the visual modality, while the linguistic concepts of blueness and
roundness belong to the linguistic modality).
We assume an open world in terms of modal features (new features can be
added, obsolete features retracted). The cross-modal learner starts with just
some basic prior knowledge of how to associate between a few basic features,
which is then gradually expanded to other features and the new ones that
are created.
The cross-modal learning problem is closely related to the problem of as-
sociation rule learning in data mining, which was first defined by Agrawal et
al. [1]. Therefore, we will base our problem definition on Agrawal’s definition
and expand it with the notions of modalities, percepts and percept unions.
We have a set of n binary attributes called features F = {f1, f2, ..., fn}
and a set of rules called the knowledge database K = {t1, t2, ..., tm}. A rule
is defined as an implication over two subset of features:
ti : X ⇒ Y (2.1)
where X, Y ⊆ F and X ∩ Y = ∅. A feature can not be part of both sides of
the implication.
The rules can be associated with several additional values – the two most
typical are the feature-set support and the rule confidence. The feature-
set support is the observed frequency of a combination of features (e.g.
supp(X) = 0.25). When the feature combination on the left side of a rule is
supported by a particular situation (i.e. we have evidence for all the features
in the combination), we consider that rule relevant for that situation. The
rule confidence is defined as
conf(X ⇒ Y ) = supp(X ∪ Y )
supp(X)
= P (Y |X). (2.2)
It can be interpreted as the estimate of the probability that a relevant rule
actually holds.
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The features represent various higher-level properties of perceived entities
based on the sensory input, while the rules encode associations between those
properties relative to a single entity. For example, we could attribute the
rule t : X ⇒ Y with the confidence conf(t) the following meaning: all the
features from the set X have been perceived in an entity, then we can claim
with confidence conf(t) that the same entity has also all the features from
the set Y.
We expand the Agrawal’s definition by introducing the notion of modal-
ity. Modalities are channels of perception based on specific sensors. A modal
feature set is a collection of features that can be perceived by a single modal-
ity. Modal feature sets are thus represented as subsets of the feature set F,
where each feature is restricted to one modal subset only:
M1 = {f11, f12, ..., f1n1}
M2 = {f21, f22, ..., f2n2}
. . . . . .
Mk = {fk1, fk2, ..., fknk}
Mm ∩Mn = ∅, m, n ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, m 6= n
F = M1 ∪M2 ∪ ... ∪Mk
(2.3)
We modify the rule-making restrictions of (2.1) accordingly:
1. N = Mm1 ∪Mm2 ∪ ... ∪Mmr , m1, ...,mr ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, r < k
2. Y ⊆ N (2.4)
3. X ⊆ F \N
We can see that modal sets are restricted to have their member features on
one side of the implication, only. This generalization of the original restriction
focuses our knowledge base on cross-modal associations. We assume that the
intra-modal associations are processed on the lower, modal levels and should
not directly influence the processes on the cross-modal level.
Next, we need a means of relating features to perceived entities. Percepts
are collections of features from a single modality. A percept is the result of
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intra-modal processing of specific types of sensory signals (usually from one
type of sensor or a group of related sensors) that belong to a single entity. A
percept acts as uni-modal representation of a perceived entity. Let P be the
set of current percepts, i.e. the percept configuration:
P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, Pi ⊆Mj. (2.5)
In any percept configuration, an entity can be represented with multiple
percepts, but not more than one per modality.
Percept unions2 are collections of percepts from different modalities. A
percept union acts as a shared representation of a perceived entity, grounded
through its percepts to different types of sensory data. Given the percept
configuration P, U(P) is the set of current percept unions, i.e. the union
configuration:
U(P) = U1, U2, ..., Um, Ui ⊆ P. (2.6)
A percept union Ui can not contain more than one percept per modality.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the concepts above with an example.
In this view, the associations between the features in the knowledge
database K encode the information about how the percepts bind to per-
cept unions. E.g. let us suppose we have percepts P1 and P2 and the rule
t : X ⇒ Y , where X ⊆ P1 and Y ⊆ P2. Then conf(t) can help us estimate
how likely it is that P1 and P2 belong to the same union. Of course, other
measures can be used instead of conf(t) to estimate the plausibility of the
rule.
Now we can define the process of binding as a mapping of a percept con-
figuration to one of the possible union configurations:
β : P→ U(P), (2.7)
2Although the term might imply otherwise, we can see in (2.20) that a percept union is
a set of percept sets (a set of sets of features), not a union of percept sets (set of features).
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Feature
Percept
Percept
union
Visual 
modality
Linguistic 
modality
"Give me the red soda can."
Scene
Utterance
shp2
clr1
shp3
clr2
red
soda Union
configuration 
Percept
configuration 
Figure 2.1: A binding example from a human-robot interaction. The robot
visual system sees two objects, resulting in two visual percepts with features
for colour and shape. Based on the previously accumulated knowledge, the
modal subsystem is able to classify the objects’ colours and shapes as ‘clr1’,
‘clr2’, ‘shp2’ and ‘shp3’. In general (and especially when modal concepts
are learned without human influence), the robot’s modal concepts do not
necessarily match human perceptions (e.g. the visual system could perceive
what we see as red and orange as the same colour). The reference in the
sentence uttered by the human results in a percept in the robot’s linguistic
modality. The ensemble of the three percepts makes the current percept
configuration. The linguistic percept and the visual percept representing
the red cylinder (can) form a single percept union, since they very probably
represent the same physical entity, whereas the percept representing the blue
box makes a separate union. The ensemble of both unions makes the current
union configuration.
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where the following restrictions apply:
1. N = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ ... ∪ Um = P
2. ∀Ui, Uj ∈ U(P), i 6= j : Ui ∩ Uj = ∅ (2.8)
3. ∀Pi, Pj ∈ Uk, i 6= j : Pi ⊆Ml ∧ Pj ⊆Mm ⇒ l 6= m
The first two binding restrictions assign each percept in the configuration to
exactly one union, while the third restricts the maximum number of percepts
per modality in a union to one. The third binding restriction follows the
assumption from (2.4) that the modal layers are able to produce consistent
modal representations of real world entities.
Finally, to make the binding process plausible, we introduce a measure of
confidence in a union configuration based on the knowledge K — the binding
confidence bconfK(U(P)). Strict definition of bconfK(U(P)) is a matter of
implementation of the binding system and depends on measures that we use
to estimate the rule plausibility (e.g. conf(t)). In general, the system should
find for every rule the frequency of support (supp(X∪Y )) and the frequency,
with which the rule is violated (supp(X) − supp(X ∪ Y )). The binding
confidence increases or decreases each time a rule is supported or broken
according to the rule’s plausibility (supported plausible rules and broken
implausible rules should increase the confidence, while broken plausible rules
and supported implausible rules should decrease it).
Given a percept configuration P and a knowledge base K, the task of the
binding process is to find the optimal union configuration:
Uopt(P) = argmax
U(P)
(bconfK(U(P))). (2.9)
In this sense – i.e. considering bconfK(U) as a predictor based on K – we can
consider higher-level cross-modal learning as a regression problem. Therefore,
the aim of the cross-modal learner is to maintain and improve the cross-
modal knowledge base, thus providing an increasingly more reliable measure
of binding confidence.
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2.2 Formulation in Markov Logic Networks
Markov logic networks (MLN) [32, 10, 9] combine first-order logic and proba-
bilistic graphical models in a single representation. An MLN knowledge base
consists of a set of first-order logic formulae (rules) with a weight attached:
weight first− orderlogicformula. (2.10)
The weight is a real number, which determines how strong a constraint each
rule is: the higher the weight, the less likely the world is to violate that rule.
Together with a finite set of constants, the MLN defines a Markov net-
work (MN) (also called ground Markov network or Markov random field). A
Markov network is an undirected graph where each possible grounding of a
predicate (all predicate variables replaced with constants) represents a node,
while the formulae define the edges connecting the nodes. Each grounded
formula defines a clique in the graph. An MLN can thus be viewed as a
template for constructing MNs. In general the probability distribution over
possible interpretations x defined by an MN is given by
P (X = x) =
1
Z
∏
φk(x{k}), (2.11)
where φk is the potential function of the clique k, x{k} is the state of the sub-
set of variables that appear in the clique k, and Z is the partition function
defined as
Z =
∑
x
∏
k
φk(x{k}). (2.12)
A convenient way to model Markov networks is logistic regression, which
defines the weight wt for the formula t as
wt = ln(
P (t)
1− P (t)), (2.13)
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where P (t) is the probability that the formula t is not violated. The proba-
bility distribution over possible worlds x is then given by
P (X = x) =
1
Z
exp(
∑
t
wtnt(x)), (2.14)
where nt(x) is the number of true groundings of the formula t, and
Z =
∑
x
exp(
∑
i
wini(x)).
The inference in Markov Networks means finding a stationary distribution
of the system. Usually we are interested in a marginal distribution of a subset
of variables, very often conditioned by some prior knowledge, called evidence
(another subset of variables whose values are known in advance). Sometimes
we are only interested in the most likely state of a subset of variables given
some evidence – Maximum a-posteriori probability estimation (MAP).
Exact inference in MN is considered a P#-complete problem [33]. Meth-
ods for approximating the distribution include various Markov chain Monte
Carlo sampling algorithms [14] and belief propagation [48]. MAP inference
in MN represents a weighted maximum satisfiability problem.
2.2.1 Cross-modal Knowledge Base
Our cross-modal knowledge base consists of two types of templates for the
binding rules. The template for the aggregative rule is defined as
perFeat(p1, f1) ∧ uniPer(u, p1) ∧ perFeat(p2, f2)⇒ uniPer(u, p2), (2.15)
where the predicate perFeat(p, f) denotes that the feature f is part of the
percept p, while uniPer(u, p) denotes that union u includes the percept p.
Variables (p1, f2, u, etc.) begin with a lowercase character. In a very similar
manner we define the template for the segregative rule:
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perFeat(p1, f1)∧uniPer(u, p1)∧ perFeat(p2, f2)⇒ ¬uniPer(u, p2). (2.16)
We can identify the aggregative rules as the mechanism that merges percepts
into common percept unions, while segregative rules separate them in distinct
unions. The template rules represent a subset of associative rules in (2.1),
restricted with (2.4), where each side is limited to one feature.
We also define the binding domain that we will use to ground the network.
A domain is a collection of typed constants. The following is an example of
binding domain with two modalities:
modality = {Language, V ision}
feature = {Red, Green, Blue, Compact, F lat, Elongated,
Box, Ball, Soda,
Clr1, Clr2, Clr3, Shp1, Shp2, Shp3}.
(2.17)
We can see that the constants (beginning with an uppercase character) can
be of two types: modalities and features. The predicate modPart(mod, feat)
is used to determine the partition of the features between modalities in the
sense of (2.3). For example:
modPart{Language, Red},
modPart{V ision, Clr1}.
Based on the example domain (2.17) a small set of grounded and weighted
binding rules could look like this:
2.5 perFeat(p1, Red) ∧ uniPer(u, p1) ∧ perFeat(p2, Clr1)⇒ uniPer(u, p2)
1.9 perFeat(p1, Red) ∧ uniPer(u, p1) ∧ perFeat(p2, Clr2)⇒ ¬uniPer(u, p2).
(2.18)
At this stage, the predicates forming the binding rules are not fully grounded
yet. They are grounded on the conceptual level only, with known features
like Red, Clr1, etc., while the unions are still represented with variables.
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In general the rules are fully grounded each time an inference is performed,
when based on some perceptual information (e.g. objects that are currently
perceived by a robot) an MN is constructed. We call the former process
concept grounding and the latter process instance grounding. Such approach
to grounding, i.e. staged grounding, can be very beneficial for a cognitive
system. While decoupling the general from the specific, it allows for the
application and adaptation of general concepts learned over longer periods
of time to the current situation in a very flexible fashion.
Using the example domain in (2.17), we can formulate the percept con-
figuration in figure 2.1 like
perFeat(P1, Clr1) ∧ perFeat(P1, Shp2) ∧
perFeat(P2, Clr2) ∧ perFeat(P2, Shp3) ∧
perFeat(P3, Red) ∧ perFeat(P3, Soda).
(2.19)
We ground the possible percept unions with constants {U1, U2, ...}. From
(2.18) and (2.19) we can infer the following union configuration as the most
probable:
uniPer(U1, P1) ∧ uniPer(U1, P3) ∧ uniPer(U2, P2). (2.20)
Percepts P1 and P3 are bound to a common percept union U1, while the
percept P2 is part of a separate percept union U2.
Besides the binding rules, the database can also contain feature priors in
the following form:
weight perFeat(percept, feature).
A feature prior denotes the default probability of a feature belonging to a
percept, which is used if there is no positive or negative evidence about it.
The feature priors can be based on the past observations, e.g. making the red
colour more likely than the pink because observed more often. Alternatively,
we can decide for arbitrary priors, e.g. uniformly distributed within a certain
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feature type, regardless of the observations (in this case, the probability to
observe a colour is equal for all known colours).
In a similar fashion to the predicate modPart, we can use the predicate
typePart to further discriminate between the feature types within modalities.
For example, if we want to distinguish between colours and shapes within
the visual modality (this is particularly useful in the case of arbitrary priors)
or maybe restrict modal percepts to just one feature from a particular group.
Such partitions are treated as intra-modal processes, therefore they should
be provided by the modal subsystems.
2.2.2 Learning
After the rules and priors (if we did not opt for arbitrary priors) are grounded
within the binding domain, we need to learn their weights. We use the gen-
erative learning method described in [32]. The learner computes a gradient
from the weights based on the number of true groundings (ni(x)) in the
learning database and the expected true groundings according to the MLN
(Ew[ni(x)]):
δ
δwi
logPw(x) = ni(x)− Ew[ni(x)], (2.21)
and optimizes the weights accordingly. Since the expectations Ew[ni(x)] are
very hard to compute, the method uses the pseudo-likelihood to approximate
it [3].
Continuous learning is performed by feeding the percept unions to the
system in small batches. In this way, we make sure that the learning affects
both aggregative and segregative rules in equal measure. Each small batch
thus represents one learning sample and typically contains 2-5 percept unions
described with perFeat and uniPer predicates.
In each learning step, the learner accepts the rule’s old weight in the
knowledge database as the mean for the Gaussian prior, which it tries to
adjust based on the new training batch. By setting the dispersion of the
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weight’s Gaussian prior to an adequate value, we ensure the learning rate of
each learning sample is proportional to its size.
In an on-line scenario, successfully inferred union configurations should
also be used as learning samples. In this case, the logistic model insures
that among the rules supported by the learning sample, the learning impact
is more pronounced on those with smaller absolute weight values. This al-
lows the system to increase the knowledge about new cross-modal concepts
without overfitting the old ones.
2.2.3 The Binding Process
In MLN, the binding process from (2.9) translates to inferring the value of
certain predicates from a graphical model (MN) over some evidence. As al-
ready seen in Section 2.2.1, an MN is a result of the processes of concept
and instance grounding. Typically, we are querying for values of the predi-
cates uniPer, where evidence includes a description of the current percept
configuration (using the predicate perFeat), a list of known and potential
percept unions, and a description of the current partial union configuration
(percepts can be assigned to already known unions). In the case of prob-
abilistic inference (e.g. MC-SAT, Gibbs sampling, etc.) the binding result
is expressed as a probability distribution for each unassigned percept over
the known and potential unions.The MAP inference on the other hand, just
outputs the most probable union configuration.
In order for the binding inference to function properly, we have to define
some hard rules (formulae with infinite weight) that reflect the binding re-
strictions in (2.8):
1. ∀p∃u : uniPer(u, p)
2. uniPer(u1, p) ∧ uniPer(u2, p)⇒ u1 = u2
3. perFeat(p1, f1) ∧ perFeat(p2, f2) ∧modPart(m, f1)
∧modPart(m, f2) ∧ uniPer(u, p1)⇒ ¬uniPer(u, p2)
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In the case of intra-modal subdivision of features with the predicate
typePart, where percepts are restricted to just one feature per type (see
Section 2.2.1), we can facilitate binding with an additional hard rule:
perFeat(p, f1) ∧ typePart(t, f1) ∧ typePart(t, f2) ∧ (f1 6= f2)
⇒ ¬perFeat(p, f2)
We can easily restrict this rule to specific feature types by grounding the
variable t.
2.3 Binding as Part of a Cognitive System
One of the main challenges of cognitive architectures [42] is how to bridge
the semantic gap between the sensory information and higher-level cognition.
This problem is in a way very related to the symbol grounding problem [15].
The sensory data is first processed by a lower cognitive layer known as the
perceptual layer. While processing on the perceptual layer is inherently intra-
modal, and there is often little or no communication between the individual
subsystems, the higher-level cognition usually assumes a-modal information.
In this sense, binding plays an important role in overcoming the semantic
gap, assuring that the resulting higher-level representations are multi-modally
grounded.
If we model representations produced by the perceptual layer as percepts
in the problem definition (Section 2.1), it is convenient to use percept unions
as the basis for the higher-level representations. A-modal higher-level repre-
sentations are thus grounded through a collection of modal percepts all the
way to the sensory data.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a possible application of the binding system de-
scribed in Section 2.2 to a cognitive system. We can see that three distinct
processes use the information from the perceptual layer:
• The process of concept grounding uses modal concepts produced by
the learning processes in modal learners (e.g. various colour and shape
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types) to ground the binding rules.
• The process of instance grounding relies on the ability of the perceptual
layer to quickly present (usually relying on one modality only) quanti-
tative estimates about the entities (instances) the cognitive system is
currently sensing. While the multi-modal representations of perceived
entities are quantitatively and qualitatively finalized by the binding
process itself (union configuration), these initial approximative repre-
sentations can be considered as a kind of placeholders for potential
entities (i.e. possible percept unions). They are devoid of any features
or other kind of attributes.
• The recognition process in modal learners results in the percept config-
uration, which represents the input to the process of binding inference.
The final product of binding – the union configuration is used both as the
Figure 2.2: Cross-modal learning and binding as part of a cognitive system.
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basis for a-modal representations in higher-level cognition, and as a source
of learning samples for weight learning.
The processes of instance grounding, binding inference and weight learn-
ing form the inner binding loop, which exploits the perceptive abilities of
modal learners and recognisers to improve its cross-modal associative power.
On the other hand, the process of concept grounding exploits the concept
forming ability of modal learners. By associating between modal concepts, it
produces new cross-modal concepts, which the inner binding loop eventually
evaluates within the existing cross-modal knowledge.
2.4 Real World Environment Issues
The real testing grounds for any cognitive architecture is of course a real world
environment, i.e. real data in real time. Even if we neglect the qualitative
aspect of real data (e.g. by assuming that it is completely handled by the
perceptual layer), we simply can not ignore its quantitative aspect, i.e. the
sheer numbers of features, entities and percepts that have to be processed
by the binding mechanism and higher cognition in a limited time. Hence,
scalability is an important requirement for every cognitive system operating
in the real world.
The quantitative aspect of the real data in an MLN reflects in the size
of the domain (constants) that is used to obtain the MN. Unfortunately,
the size of an MN (number of grounded predicates and rules) can increase
exponentially with the size of the domain – and size increases the inference
time. Several generic solutions have been proposed to tackle the scalability
problem of MLN, improving either the grounding process [28] or the inference
itself [31].
A good implementation practice is to filter the formulae by the value
of their weights before grounding them (the more the absolute weight of a
formula approaches zero, the less relevant the formula is). Applied to our
particular case this would result in an additional preprocessing step, prior
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to instance grounding that would purge the cross-modal knowledge base of
irrelevant or immature associations. This would diminish the number of edges
in the graphical model, thus relieving the binding inference of some processing
burden. The weight learning would still affect the whole knowledge base.
Furthermore, the cognitive system might even exploit the filtering mechanism
to its advantage. Depending on situation, it could achieve faster response,
or greater reliability and accuracy by regulating the filtering criterion.
In Section 2.1 we neglected the real-time issues, implying a somewhat
static concept of percept configuration, where the system synchronously ac-
quires percepts from different modalities. In the real-world environment, a
percept configuration is rather subject to continuous smaller scale changes,
typically involving only a small set of percepts from a single modality at
a time. Substantial time differences in percept output between modalities
can be expected even in the case of concurrent sensory stimuli. This scales
down the original binding problem from Section 2.1. Rather than re-binding
the whole percept configuration, the system only needs to establish how a
fresh subset of percepts from a single modality relates to the existing union
configuration. The real-world challenges could also prompt us to explore
various possibilities of breaking the single graphical model implied in Section
2.1 into several smaller ones. For example, the system could first separately
determine how a new percept relates to each of the existing percept unions
and then, if necessary, combine only the most promising combinations to a
single graphical model.
Chapter 3
George – a Prototype of a
Cognitive System
In this chapter we present George, a robot prototype that implements a few
of the most typical characteristics of cognitive systems. More comprehensive
descriptions of George are available in [39, 37]. In brief, George is capable of
active exploration (by turning its head) of its immediate surroundings, and of
perception of small objects in them. It is also capable of making conversation
about its perceptions with a human tutor, and of learning about objects’
properties from that conversation.
George is the result of a joint research effort of six partners1, within
the FP7 European project CogX. Its purpose might be best described as
a demonstration and evaluation platform for various cognitive paradigms,
like visual attention, situated dialogue with another agent, learning through
situated dialogue, motivation, planning, etc. (each of the partners involved
in its creation, had its own particular agenda about what kind of cognitive
mechanism to integrate in George). Thus, George represents the ultimate
testing ground for such paradigms – a logical next step in evaluation after
1University of Birmingham (UK), DFKI (Germany), KTH Stockholm (Sweden), Uni-
versity of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Alfred Ludwig University of Freiburg (Germany) and TU
Wien (Austria).
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the classic off-line experiments (like the ones in Section 5.1).
Figure 3.1: George in a learning interaction with a tutor.
During the years George (and his predecessor Playmate [45]) was built,
an important lesson about artificial cognitive systems emerged: the key to
a good cognitive system is the integration. Of course, it is not unexpected
that we need some kind of solid integration to make various cognitive com-
ponents work together. However, if we want to fully exploit the potential of
each mechanism, and at the same time make them work as coherent unified
system, in such case the complexity and the sophistication of the integration
will probably have to exceed the cumulative complexity of individual com-
ponents. The integration we are talking about, must not be understood in
a technical sense, only, but also as the integration of paradigms, or some-
times even very basic ideas. Often, in the process of building George, it was
necessary to modify assumptions or sacrifice important ideas about your cog-
nitive paradigm in order to make the integration plausible. In this view, it
is no surprise that we had to considerably adapt our binding platform from
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Chapter 2, though the fundamental principles remain the same.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is also to prepare the reader for what
follows in Chapter 4, where we describe, how we adapted, upgraded and
finally integrated into George the principles described in Chapter 2. The
content of this chapter is a digest of a more detailed description of George
available in [39]. We begin by describing the main competencies and repre-
sentations that characterize the cognitive system. Section 3.2 focuses on the
implementation and the integration of the system. Finally, in Section 3.3 we
give an overview of the basic behaviour of the robot.
3.1 System Competencies and
Representations
A robotic system for interactive learning in dialogue with a human must have
the competencies to generate the required behaviour, including the ability
to process representations stemming from different modalities. Figure 3.2
provides an overview of the main competencies in the George prototype sys-
tem and the relationships between them. By processing visual information
and communicating with humans, the system forms beliefs about the world.
They are exploited by behaviour generation mechanisms that select actions
to perform in order to extend the system’s knowledge about visual concepts.
In this section, we describe the individual competencies and representations
required for interactive learning. To make these descriptions more concrete
we first present an illustrative example, which briefly demonstrates the capa-
bilities of the system, allowing us to ground later explanations in a real-world
example.
3.1.1 An Example of Interaction
Consider a scene similar to the one presented in Figure 3.1. A human tutor
and the robot system are engaged in a dialogue aiming to teach the robot
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Figure 3.2: System competencies and relationships between them. Schema
taken from [39].
about visual concepts, such as colour (e.g. red, blue, etc.), shape (elongated,
compact) and object types (e.g. a mug, a bottle, etc.). The tutor puts the
objects in the scene, and describes them or asks questions about them. In
this scenario, all the perceptual entities (objects) are restricted to be a single
shape, (predominant) colour and type. The robot looks around the scene,
detects the objects, and processes the visual and linguistic information, thus
trying to understand his environment. Based on his understanding of the
scene, he plans how to learn more about the objects and their properties.
Let us suppose that the current view of the robot is depicted in Figure
3.3. The tutor may convey new information to the robot by describing one
of the objects (e.g., H: ‘The blue object is a bottle. It is elongated.’). After
establishing common ground, by determining which object the human is
referring to, the robot can update its knowledge about the concepts of “a
bottle” and “elongatedness”. The human may also ask the robot a question
(e.g., H: ‘Which colour is the tea box?’). The robot will answer the question
(R: ‘It is red.’). However, it could also take the initiative, and ask the
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tutor a question that would require an answer. That would increase its
knowledge about the objects currently perceived in the scene, and about
object properties in general (R: ‘What shape is the cornflakes box?’, or R:
‘Please, show me something green.’). The robot can also point at an object
to avoid ambiguous questions; e.g., since there are two mugs, and two red and
two yellow objects in the scene, the robot can not refer to one of the mugs
verbally, so it would point at one of them to establish the common ground.
Only then it would ask a question like R: ‘What shape is this object?’. In such
a mixed initiative dialogue, the robot tries to get as much information from his
tutor as possible to learn about objects and their properties. In the remainder
of this section, we will describe the competencies and representations that
facilitate these kinds of behaviour.
Figure 3.3: An example of a scene George can learn from.
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3.1.2 Attention Driven Vision2
To learn autonomously about visual object concepts, the robot has to be able
to detect new objects, when they are presented, as well as identify interesting
parts of the scene. Since the robot can not have models for unknown objects,
it can not rely on model based detection and recognition. Instead, it requires
a more general mechanism. Hence, George relies on a generic, bottom-up 3D
attention mechanism for object detection.
To make the problem of generic segmentation of unknown objects tractable,
the system assumes that objects are always presented on a supporting sur-
face such as the table in Figure 3.3. Given 3D point clouds that are obtained
with an RGB-D sensor, the system detects supporting planes using a variant
of particle swarm optimization [49, 50]. Any point clouds sticking out from
the detected supporting planes are labelled as 3D spaces of interest (SOIs),
i.e. something that is potentially interesting to the system (in the case of
Figure 3.3, the robot would detect five different SOIs). Using their position,
size and colour histogram, the system can track over time individual SOIs,
thus eliminating transient features or noise.
Figure 3.4: Segmented point cloud, detected objects, and a close-up view of
a foveated object.
A segmentation that is based on the RGB-D data, only, is not reliable. In
our case, it may include points with erroneously assigned background colour,
due to shadowing effects at object boundaries. Therefore, by using the graph
cut ([4]) method, SOIs are supplemented with a precise segmentation mask.
2This section abridges Section 2.2 in [39].
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This segmentation happens in a foveated (i.e. higher-resolution) view of the
potential object, using an RGB image from a camera with a longer focal
length than the RGB-D sensor. The object features, used for learning visual
properties, are extracted based on this segmentation mask (e.g. the medians
of the HSL colour values of all foreground pixels, different shape features,
etc.). Figure 3.4 shows the results of processing the scene depicted in Figure
3.3: the segmented point cloud, the detected objects and the close-up view
after foveating on an object. Segmented objects are then subject to individual
processing.
3.1.3 Learning and Recognizing Object Properties3
To efficiently store and generalise visual information, the visual features of
object properties (such as colours and basic shapes) are internally repre-
sented as generative models. These generative models take the form of prob-
ability density functions (PDFs) over the feature space, and are constructed
in an on-line fashion from new observations. This continuous learning pro-
cess extracts visual data in the form of multidimensional features from the
segmented objects (e.g. features relating to shape, texture, colour and inten-
sity). The on-line discriminative Kernel Density Estimator (odKDE [25])
gradually constructs estimations of the PDFs in this feature space. A partic-
ularly important property of the odKDE is that it allows adaptation of the
models from both, the positive and the negative examples (i.e. learning and
unlearning; [26]).
During its on-line operation, the system maintains a multivariate gener-
ative model (e.g. over HSL colour feature space) for each one of the visual
concepts (e.g. every colour) that were already introduced. Furthermore, for
mutually exclusive sets of concepts (e.g. all colours), the optimal feature sub-
space is continually determined by feature selection. This feature subspace
is used to construct a Bayesian classifier for individual object properties.
In addition, the system maintains an “unknown model”, which accounts
3This section is a digest of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 in [39].
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for poor classification when none of the current concept models supports
the last observation strongly enough. Having built such a knowledge model
and Bayesian classifier, recognition is done by inspecting the a-posteriori
probabilities over individual concepts and the unknown model.
By analysing the a-posteriori probability, the system is able to determine
the information gain for every concept. The information gain for a concept
estimates how much the system would increase its knowledge if it were to
receive information from the tutor about that concept with respect to a given
object. This serves as a basis for triggering situated extrospective learning
mechanisms.
Furthermore, even in the absence of visible objects, the system can in-
spect its models and determine which model is the weakest or most ambigu-
ous. Based on this estimate, the information gain for every concept is again
calculated, regardless of what is visible. This measure is used to initiate
introspective learning.
Besides generic object properties, George is also able to recognise and
learn object types. The method [51] combines appearance based (RGB im-
age) and shape based (point cloud) visual features into multi-view object
models. The views are incrementally acquired from RGB-D images, and are
aligned using sparse bundle adjustment. Type recognition uses RANSAC to
find a matching view from the features extracted from the object RGB image
and point cloud. Even though what is essentially an object instance based
recogniser is used as a type classifier, this works well enough in handling the
variability encountered in George scenarios.
3.1.4 Situated Dialogue4
The other external source of information for George is its tutor. In task-
oriented interactions between a human and a robot, there is more to dialogue
than just understanding words. The robot not only needs to understand what
is being talked about, but also why something was told. In other words, what
4This section is a digest of Section 2.5 in [39].
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the tutor intends the robot to do with the information in the larger context
of their joint activity (e.g. which part of information received from the tutor
is intended for learning).
An intention is a goal-oriented cognitive state, usually modelled as an
explicit commitment to acting in order to achieve a goal or desire [5, 8].
George’s communication system explicitly models communicative intentions
(i.e. intentions that are related to communication, as opposed to the robot’s
purely internal intentions or goals; see Section 3.1.6), and uses them as a
pragmatic representation of the human-robot interaction, abstracting away
from the actual surface form.
The system employs continual abduction ([22]) to generate and verify
hypotheses about the tutor’s behaviour in terms of communicative intentions.
Abduction is a method of explanatory logical reasoning ([11]). Given a theory
T , a rule T ` A → B and a fact B, abduction allows inferring A as an
explanation of B. B can be deductively inferred from A ∪ T . If T 6` A, then
we say that A is an assumption. There may be many possible causes of B
besides A. Abduction amounts to guessing ; assuming that the premise is
true, the conclusion holds too.
Abductive reasoning over intentions in a situated context is a bi-directional
process ([41]) that the system uses in two roles: recognition of the tutor’s
communicative intentions (inferring their intention given the context and a
surface form of their input); and realisation of the robot’s communicative
intentions (inferring an appropriate surface form given the context and the
robot’s intention).
3.1.5 Higher-Level Representation with Beliefs
By processing visual information and communicating with the human, the
system forms beliefs about the world. Beliefs are data structures that con-
tain indexical information about perceived entities. They form a represen-
tational layer where multi-modal and multi-agent information is associated
and merged to create a-modal representations – a process akin binding. In
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general, we can regard a belief as a higher-level representation of an element
of the physical reality, potentially grounded in one or more sensory inputs,
and attributed to specific agents or groups. In George, a single belief contains
information about a single entity, but there can be many beliefs about the
same entity. The contents of beliefs are expressed as multivariate probability
distributions over feature-value pairs. We provide a more detailed account
of the belief layer in Chapter 4.
3.1.6 Motivation5
In order to discover and make sense of its surroundings, George has to per-
form multiple, possibly interleaved, goal-directed activities. As a cognitive
system that must fill gaps in its own knowledge, it is important that it is able
to generate and manage its own goals, since the opportunities available to it
at runtime may be unknown or unpredictable at design-time. The motiva-
tion framework [16, 47] encodes the drives of the system (the general types
of things it wants to achieve) as a collection of goal generators. Each of them
generates particular types of goals for the system based on the current belief
state and communication with the tutor. A goal is a description of a desired
future situation (e.g. to know the colour of a newly visible object).
The goal generators in George create goals necessary to engage in situated
dialogue with a human tutor and to learn about its surroundings. A partic-
ular goal generator monitors the communicative intentions provided by the
dialogue subsystem as it interprets tutor’s utterances (see 3.1.4). Based on
their content, this generator creates goals to answer questions about objects,
or to perform learning. Each of these goals contains a reference to the merged
belief representing the referred object, and other intention-specific informa-
tion. Another goal generator handles the situation where a set of possible
intentions has been generated in response to an ambiguous reference. In this
case, the goal not only includes the content describing the future state, but
5This section abridges the part of Section 2.8 in [39] that describes the motivation
system.
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an existentially qualified reference to a belief that represents the possible ref-
erents of the intention. Part of George’s task is then to resolve this reference
before it can act on its content.
Each potential goal has to pass through a management system that de-
termines which of them should be pursued, i.e. activated. The aim of this
filtering step is to prioritise important or more appropriate goals in given
situation. The system activates goals based on a priority hierarchy of drives.
Each of three drives in this hierarchy controls a type of behaviour that George
was designed to perform. The highest priority drive is to answer tutor’s ques-
tions, followed by the drive to learn by extrospection (i.e. inspecting the world
external to the agent). At the lowest level, we find the drive to learn by in-
trospection. Goals of a particular priority suppress the activation of goals
with lower priorities. Goals that pass through this filter are ranked accord-
ing to heuristics provided by their goal generators. The top ranked goals are
activated.
3.1.7 Planning6
Once goals are activated, it is up to the planning system, how to achieve
them in the current context. An active goal and the current context (which
is derived from the belief state) form a planning problem description. Plan
execution, execution monitoring and replanning is managed via a collection of
action interfaces that trigger individual components in the modality-specific
subsystems. The planning system is based on the fast downward planner
[19]. This is a state of the art planning system based on heuristic forward
search, extended by a preprocessing routine, which enables the support of
object fluents and numerical constants by compiling them away, and deal with
the uncertainty of the real-world environment by using a continual planning
approach ([6]).
The dialogue with a tutor plays a central role in the George scenario.
Asking and answering questions is crucial for all three George’s drives. Hence,
6This section abridges the part of Section 2.8 in [39] that describes the planning system.
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the planner must generate plans that establish a common ground with the
tutor about the object of their discussion. For instance, a possible initial
ambiguity in a dialogue is represented by having multiple objects as the
referents of a tutor’s question, alongside a goal to only have a single referent.
The planner can predict the effects of available clarification actions on its
interpretation of that reference. It uses these actions to create a plan, which
it expects to remove the ambiguity and leave only a single referent that will
be the next topic of the conversation.
George can choose between two types of actions for clarifying a reference:
describing the object verbally, or pointing at it with its arm. Since a verbal
description is considered cheaper, George will always try to describe the
object first, if it has a combination of recognised properties that is unique
among the perceived objects, and can be verbalised. Otherwise, it will resort
to pointing. Once a common ground is established, the planner will determine
a suitable answer or question from the belief state, and trigger learning, if
necessary. Examples of behaviour generated by George’s planning system
are available in Section 5.2.
3.2 Implementation and Integration
To make the competencies described above work together in a robotic system,
a sophisticated means of integration is needed. The implementation and
integration of George is based on CAST, the CoSy Architecture Schema
Toolkit [17]. CAST is a distributed working-memory model composed of
several sub-architectures, each implementing a different functionality. A sub-
architecture (SA) contains one or more components each running in its own
thread. The components communicate through a working memory (WM).
When the state of a component changes, it either adds an entry (of a certain
type) containing the relevant information to the WM, updates an existing
entry in the WM, or deletes it from the WM. Another component can register
with the WM to receive notifications whenever changes to entries of a certain
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type occur. This allows links between multiple components to be established,
and for information to be passed accordingly. The architectural approach is
described in more detail in [17, 18].
George is composed of six CAST SAs. Figure 3.5 presents George from the
system point of view. It illustrates its complexity, and denotes the relations
between individual components.
The Visual SA is responsible for visual processing. It implements compe-
tencies described in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. The SA uses a Kinect RGB-D
Figure 3.5: A schematic view of George system architecture. Rounded boxes
represent the components, rectangles represent the data structures, while
arrows indicate information flow. Schema taken from [39].
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sensor for pre-attentive vision, i.e. identifying and processing spaces of inter-
est (SOIs) as they appear in the scene. On the other hand, it uses a narrow
field-of-view Point Grey Flea 2 camera for attentive vision, i.e. deliberate
extraction of object properties. The attention mechanism also makes use of
the Direct Perception pan/tilt unit (part of Spatial SA) for bringing SOIs
into the centre of view.
The Dialogue SA provides the functionality for the situated dialogue. The
system uses a third party software for speech recognition, and the Mary TTS
system for speech production7. The SA implements techniques presented in
Section 3.1.4 for recognition of the tutor’s intentions and realisation of robot’s
intentions in the situated context. The robot also uses the Neuronics Katana
6M (5 DOF) robotic arm for pointing at objects. The arm is controlled via
Golem [24], and is part of Manipulation SA).
Beliefs are collected in the Binder SA, which represents a central hub
for gathering information about perceptions from different modalities (sub-
architectures). The Planning SA monitors the beliefs, and generates appro-
priate behaviour as described in Section 3.1.6. As new beliefs appear, they
trigger goal generators to produce planning goals, while the overall set of cur-
rent beliefs represent the planning state. During a plan execution, requests
are sent to the Visual, Spatial, Manipulation and Dialogue SAs to perform
planned actions, which generates the desired behaviour.
3.3 Basic Behaviours
George is a very complex and heterogeneous cognitive system. This means
that even its basic mechanisms of behaviour combine functionalities dis-
tributed across several sub-architectures, hence the need for a tight and
meaningful integration of its components. Very often, those behaviours re-
quire that different functionalities are executed in parallel, although in a
synchronised manner. The cognitive mechanisms that implement George’s
7http://mary.dfki.de
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behaviour can be grouped in four main groups:
• mechanisms for visual perception,
• tutor initiated interaction,
• extrospective learning mechanisms,
• introspective learning mechanisms.
Two mechanisms provide the robot with the visual information. The first
one is bottom-up, and is triggered by changes in the scene. It makes sure
that the robot analyses the objects that are brought in his view. The second
one is top-down, and is triggered by the motivation subsystem. It makes the
robot explore the scene, using its pan-tilt unit, searching for new objects that
were possibly introduced to his surroundings, while it was looking away.
Interaction with a human tutor is one of the crucial abilities of this cog-
nitive system. Interaction can be triggered by the tutor or by the robot. The
tutor can trigger interaction in three ways: by asking the robot to execute an
instruction, by asking robot a question (e.g., ‘What colour is the coke can?’
or ‘Is the coke can red?’), or by giving the robot useful information (e.g.,
‘The coke can is red.’) that can be used for learning (situated tutor-driven
learning). These mechanisms are triggered by the system’s interaction goals.
Of course, a cognitive system can not just passively wait for tutor’s learn-
ing instructions, it has to exploit learning opportunities. It should actively
look for, ask for, and use the information that would help to extend its
knowledge. These learning mechanisms associated with such behaviour (the
situated autonomous learning and the situated tutor-assisted learning) are
part of George’s extrospective drive. The goal generators monitor the beliefs
for information that can be exploited for learning. They generate a goal for
each possible learning opportunity.
In the absence of opportunities for situated learning, the robot can still
actively engineer interactions to provide new information. E.g., the robot can
autonomously search for new objects, or even ask another agent to provide
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one (specifying the properties that are the most interesting). This behaviour
is based exclusively on introspection of the existing property models. From
a pool of currently maintained models, the robot selects the one it considers
the least adequate (typically inadequately sampled), and initiates an action
that tries to obtain new samples to improve it.
Chapter 4
Bridging the Semantic Gap in
George
As we saw in Chapter 3, the two critical properties of a cognitive system
operating in a complex environment are (i) the ability to sense, perceive and
process complex information about physical reality, and (ii) the ability to
use this information to plan, manage and execute complex actions in such an
environment. The complexity of the physical reality implies the ability to col-
lect information from different sources, i.e. different sensor types and possibly
different agents (other than the cognitive system itself). This means that at
least on lower levels the information is inherently multi-modal and multi-
agent. On the other hand, the higher cognition (e.g. motivation, planning,
etc.) predominantly assumes a-modal information. Hence, an intermediate
cognitive layer capable to relate and merge multi-modal and multi-agent in-
formation is needed to close the semantic gap that divides the lower and the
higher cognition.
In this chapter, we describe in more detail the intermediate cognitive layer
of the prototype cognitive system George. As we saw earlier, the scenario
assumes a robot (George) capable of making situated dialogue with a human
tutor about objects on a table. The robot is thus able to observe, track and
recognise the objects on the table, and through the dialogue with the tutor
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improve its knowledge about the objects’ properties (cross-modal learning).
Such a scenario obviously relies on the ability of the robot to first associate,
and later merge multi-agent information. Higher-level cognitive processes,
like motivation and planning, can then use the resulting representations.
4.1 Reference Resolution
The process of determining the denotation of a referring expression is called
reference resolution. In a cognitive system, reference resolution can be for-
mulated as a process akin to binding that tries to associate multi-agent in-
formation. Both processes can operate on the same cognitive layer, called
the belief layer, briefly introduced in Section 4.2. As we will see later, in
Section 4.3, the difference between robot’s own perceptions and information
attributed to another agent both encoded in beliefs can be directly exploited
for implicit learning.
In general, the binding in Markov Logic Networks is applied to an in-
termediate cognitive layer, where the various beliefs represent perceived and
assumed facts. These beliefs are used to instantiate the rules from the cross-
modal knowledge base to a Markov graphical model. We saw in Section 2.3
that MLN knowledge represents the general rules encoding relations between
concepts (e.g. object properties as colour, shape,etc.), while a graphical model
encodes the relations between concrete instances (objects) that are currently
perceived by the system. A successful inference results in a shared multi-
modal representation of a physical entity. Such representations can be used
as learning opportunities to improve cross-modal knowledge.
In George, the principles of binding are used for reference resolution. We
base our implementation of this process on the general method of binding in
Markov logic networks described in Section 2.2. In our case, the robot uses
reference resolution to relate its own perceptions to information attributed to
a human tutor. Hence, reference resolution is critical for its ability to make
situated dialogue with the human.
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We implemented the MLN as a set of components that process informa-
tion stored in beliefs (see Figure 4.1). A MLN engine component maintains
a Markov network graphical model, which makes continuous on-line infer-
ence (MCMC sampling), and can continuously adapt to the changes in be-
liefs. MLN engines can also combine the information encoded in the current
graphical model with external information about the correct inference out-
come to perform on-line weight learning. MLN client components filter the
information stored in beliefs or other data structures, and feed it to MLN
engines. They can also read and process inference results, and trigger weight
learning in MLN engines.
The implementation of reference resolution in George features a single
MLN engine and two MLN clients. One MLN client (the belief filter) contin-
uously filters the information in beliefs, and forwards it to the MLN engine
as evidence about perceived entities. The other MLN client (the restrictor)
acts on request; triggered by the dialogue subsystem (when it recognises a
referring expression in the tutor’s utterance) it first feeds the MLN engine
with the referring (restrictive) information, then reads and forwards the re-
sult of the inference back to the dialogue subsystem, and finally withdraws
the referring information.
The result of the MLN inference is a probability distribution over per-
ceived entities, represented as beliefs. The dialogue subsystem uses it to
determine the interpretation of the tutor’s utterance. This eventually results
in additional beliefs related to the ones grounded in robot perceptions (see
Section 4.2). As a consequence of successful reference resolution, the restric-
tor can also trigger weight learning in the MLN engine. A successful reference
resolution usually means that the resulting probability distribution favours
with a suitable degree of reliability the denotation to one of the existing
beliefs. In this case, the restrictor first feeds the ‘winning’ resolution to the
MLN engine as evidence, and then triggers the learning. Afterwards, it with-
draws both pieces of evidence, the referring information and the ‘winning’
resolution, from the MLN engine.
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Figure 4.1: Implementation and integration of reference resolution in George.
4.1.1 An Example of Reference Resolution
The following is an example of reference resolution performed in an MLN
engine component. We assume a small MLN reference resolution knowledge
database that encodes associations between two visual colour models (de-
noted as Color1 and Color2) and two linguistic colour descriptions (Red
and Blue):
2.5 percColor(b, Color1) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(b)
−1.9 percColor(b, Color1) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(b)
−1.3 percColor(b, Color2) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(b)
2.0 percColor(b, Color2) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(b)
The predicate percColor(b, Color1) denotes that the object represented by
the belief b was perceived to be of modal colour representation Color1 by the
visual subsystem. The predicate restrict(Red) denotes Red as the restric-
tion (referring information, see Section 4.2.1) given by the tutor, while the
predicate resolveTo(b) denotes the reference resolution to the belief b. As
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is the case in Section 2.2, variables begin with a lowercase character, while
constants begin with an uppercase character.
We can see that the rules in the knowledge database instantiate concept
(in our case the colours), but encode beliefs about objects as variables. The
predicate resolveTo(b) is also the object of the MLN engine query. The
inference can result in the following probability distribution, for example:
0.2 resolveTo(B1)
0.1 resolveTo(B2)
0.7 resolveTo(B3)
As was the case in Section 2.2.1, the real numbers denote the probabilities. In
addition to the knowledge database, the reference resolution system includes
the following set of hard rules (similar to the binding restrictions in Section
2.2.3) that regulate the inference process:
1. belief(b1) ∧ belief(b2) ∧ resolveTo(b1) ∧ resolveTo(b2)⇒ b1 = b2
2. resolveTo(b)⇒ belief(b)
3. resolveTo(b)⇒ ∃f : restrict(f)
The hard rules are rules with an infinite weight that can never be broken.
The predicate belief(b) denotes the existence of belief b. Rule 1 restricts
the reference resolution to exactly one belief, rule 2 restricts the reference
resolution to an existing belief, and finally, rule 3 makes reference resolution
possible only when referring information exists.
Let us suppose the system perceives two objects on the desktop, one red
(perceived as Color1) and one blue (perceived as Color2). The belief filter
feeds the MLN engine with the following evidence:
belief(B1) ∧ belief(B2) ∧ percColor(B1, Color1) ∧ percColor(B2, Color2)
Based on this information the MLN engine builds a Markov Network graph-
ical model (MN). First it instantiates the rules with both beliefs:
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2.5 percColor(B1, Color1) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
−1.9 percColor(B1, Color1) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
−1.3 percColor(B1, Color2) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.0 percColor(B1, Color2) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.5 percColor(B2, Color1) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.9 percColor(B2, Color1) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.3 percColor(B2, Color2) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
2.0 percColor(B2, Color2) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
∞ ¬resolveTo(B1) ∨ ¬resolveTo(B2)
∞ ¬resolveTo(B1) ∧ ¬resolveTo(B2)
Then it applies the evidence to the instantiated rules:
2.5 restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
−1.9 restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
−1.3 percColor(B1, Color2) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.0 percColor(B1, Color2) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.5 percColor(B2, Color1) ∧ restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.9 percColor(B2, Color1) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.3 restrict(Red)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
2.0 restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
∞ ¬resolveTo(B1) ∨ ¬resolveTo(B2)
∞ ¬resolveTo(B1) ∧ ¬resolveTo(B2)
(4.1)
The instantiated rules above represents a MN, where each fully instantiated pred-
icate represents a sampling variable (atom). The MLN engine performs a continu-
ous inference that in the present case (because of the last instantiated rule, derived
from the hard rule 3) does not yield any positive resolution.
Now, let us suppose that a human refers to a red object in his utterance. By
the request of the dialogue subsystem, the restrictor component feeds the MLN
engine with the predicate restrict(Red). This new piece of information modifies
the graphical model as follows:
4.1. REFERENCE RESOLUTION 47
2.5 resolveTo(B1)
−1.9 restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
−1.3 percColor(B1, Color2)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.0 percColor(B1, Color2) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B1)
2.5 percColor(B2, Color1)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.9 percColor(B2, Color1) ∧ restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
−1.3 resolveTo(B2)
2.0 restrict(Blue)⇒ resolveTo(B2)
∞ ¬resolveTo(B1) ∨ ¬resolveTo(B2)
As we can see, the referent information also removes the hard rule preventing
any positive reference resolution. The inference result is now clear; the result-
ing probability distribution reliably indicates the belief B1 as the referent. The
restrictor forwards this information to the dialogue subsystem and removes the
referent information, which returns the graphical model to the state in (4.1).
Saliency can be a very useful addition to the situated human-robot dialogue.
An object on the desktop can become salient because of non-verbal communication
(e.g., the robot or the human pointing with his arm, or directing his gaze towards
an object), or simply by being the only object on the desktop. The information
about the saliency has to be part of the belief representing the object. The be-
lief filter can feed this information to the MLN engine simply as the predicate
salient(B1). The human can then refer to that object with the word ‘this’, which
the restrictor can represent with the predicate restrict(This). The easiest way
to implement this mechanism is to add another rule to the regulative set of hard
rules:
salient(b) ∧ restrict(This)⇒ resolveTo(b).
When the human refers to a salient object with the word ‘this’, the (in-
stantiated) hard rule above simply overrules all the instantiated soft rules in
the graphical model, resolving the reference to the salient object.
48 CHAPTER 4. BRIDGING THE SEMANTIC GAP IN GEORGE
4.2 The Belief Layer
Beliefs form a cognitive layer where multi-modal and multi-agent information
is associated and merged to a-modal representations. In general, a belief can
be regarded as a higher-level representation of an element of the physical
reality, which is grounded in one or more sensory inputs, attributed to a
specific agent, or a combination of both. Our belief scheme distinguishes five
distinct belief categories:
• Private beliefs reflect the robot’s perceptions of the environment based
on its sensory input. Private beliefs are expressed in modal symbols
and can form various associations with private beliefs stemming from
other modalities or beliefs with other epistemic statuses.
• Assumed beliefs are used to establish cross-agent or cross-modal com-
mon ground. They are created from private beliefs by translating the
modal symbols to the a-modal ones. Depending on complexity of the
modal learners and their ability for autonomous unsupervised learn-
ing, this process can be as simple as one-to-one symbol mapping or
much more complex (e.g. translating between two sets of symbols with
overlapping meaning that consequently also modifies the original prob-
ability distribution). In cross-agent case, the robot uses assumed be-
liefs to establish a common ground with another agent to facilitate
communication. Thus, the beliefs reflect the robot assumptions about
the meaning of its perceived information for a particular agent (e.g.
human). In cross-modal case, the assumed beliefs establish a com-
mon ground between modalities. In both cases, this process facilitates
cross-belief information fusion in later stages.
• Attributed beliefs contain information that robot attributes to another
agent (e.g. human). This kind of beliefs are the direct consequence
of some kind of communication with another agent. The robot is in
principle able to analyse and understand the information in such beliefs,
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but does not necessarily agree with it (especially, if it does not match
its own perception of the same reality).
• Verified beliefs are created from attributed beliefs. They contain the ac-
knowledged information from the attributed beliefs. Acknowledgement
(or verification) does not necessarily mean that the agent’s information
in the belief is consistent with the robot’s perception; it just means
that that information was adequately processed, and is now ready to
be used in higher-level cognition (e.g. in communication with the agent
that issued it). After a successful reference resolution, the restrictive
information is stored in verified shared beliefs, while the asserted infor-
mation is in attributed belief.
• Merged beliefs combine information from verified and assumed beliefs,
and represent the final a-modal situated knowledge, ready to be used
by the higher level cognitive processes (like motivation and planning).
They contain as reliable information as possible, and as much infor-
mation as available. Information can be merged in different ways. For
example, the system can completely trust a certain agent (typically a
tutor), so that the merged belief contains all information from the veri-
fied belief, and only uses the assumed belief to fill the information gaps
left by the verified belief. A more complex solution for the information
fusion involves merging probability distributions over feature values.
The merging process is also called information fusion.
Private beliefs are created by mediator components, using the information
from modal subsystems. On the other hand, attributed and verified beliefs
are products of successful resolutions of another agent’s references. The
changes in perception propagate in real-time through the belief structure,
from private beliefs to the merged ones. In a similar manner, the progress
in dialogue and dialogue processing (certain events in other subsystems can
be treated as acknowledgements for the attributed information) are reflected
in changes in attributed and verified beliefs. This means that the process
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of information fusion (belief merging) has to be repeated each time new
perceptual information propagates to the assumed belief, or new attributed
information is verified.
4.2.1 An Example of Information Flow in Beliefs
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate how belief representations of an object
change with the activity of the system. Objects are described in terms of
colours, shapes and affordances1. The goal of the system is to use the new
information provided by a human tutor for visual learning.
Figure 4.2 represents the state of beliefs after the robot has processed the
visual information about a physical object on the desktop. It reflects the
robot’s own perception of the object. We can see that the internal (modal)
visual symbols (and the object’s affordance, which is based on its shape)
are translated to a-modal symbols (in our case the dialogue subsystem also
operates with a-modal symbols). The translation can be performed by an
MLN engine component. As described in Section 4.1, the translation can be
more than just a simple symbol mapping; it can also have to re-calculate the
probability distributions of the translated symbols. The merging process in
this case just forwards the information to the merged belief.
Figure 4.3 represents the structure of beliefs after the system has pro-
cessed a tutor’s statement about the object (“The compact object is blue.”).
In this sentence the ‘compact’ represents the referring or restrictive infor-
mation, which is used to determine (restrict) the entity in question. With
the assertive information in the sentence (‘blue’) the human expressed a new
quality about the referred entity (perhaps not known to the robot). The as-
sertive information does not completely agree with the robot’s perceptions.
Fortunately, the restrictive part of the statement is consistent with the ana-
logue information in the current merged belief, which guarantees the success
of the reference resolution. We can see that the information attributed to
1An affordance of an object is the possibility of an action to be performed on that
object by an agent [13].
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the tutor is initially split in two parts. The restrictive part is already consid-
ered verified (since the reference resolution was successful), and goes to the
verified belief, while the assertive part goes to the attributed belief, since it
is not yet clear, whether it represents a common ground between the robot’s
and tutor’s perceptions (we can see that in our particular example the doubt
is justified). We can see that the merging process confirms the shape infor-
mation in the merged belief.
Figure 4.4 illustrates what happens after a certain event in other parts
of the system (in our case the visual learning) triggers the acknowledgement
(of a portion) of the asserted information. The acknowledged attributed in-
merged
private
-color1
-shape3
-aordance2
assumed
-red
-compact
-roll
-red
-compact
-roll
translate
merge
1. The robot's perception of an object
 on the desktop 
Figure 4.2: A structure of beliefs reflecting the robot’s own perception of an
object.
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formation is propagated to the verified belief, and then merged. In our case,
the colour property is replaced with its attributed version. The merged belief
therefore contains one piece of information that is purely perceptual (‘roll’);
the information about the shape (‘compact’) is shared by both, robot’s
perception and human’s description; the colour information (‘blue’) is not
shared, but since it is provided by the tutor, it is treated as more reliable.
merged
assumed
-red
-compact
-roll
-red
-compact
-roll
translate
merge
veried
-compact
attributed
-blue
"The compact
object is
blue."
-color1
-shape3
-a ordance2
private
1. The robot's perception of an object on the desktop
2. The tutor makes a statement about the object
Figure 4.3: A belief structure merging the robot’s perception of an object
with the description that a human tutor provides about the same object. At
this stage, only the restrictive part of the description was merged. The red
colour denotes the changes in the structure during this stage.
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merged
assumed
-red
-compact
-roll
-red
-compact
-roll
translate
merge
1. The robot's perception of an object on the desktop
veried
-compact
"The compact
object is
blue."
2. The tutor makes a statement about the object
-color1
-shape3
-a ordance2
private
verication
attributed
-blue
-blue
blue
3. The robot acknowledges the asserted information
    about the object (e.g. with learning)
Figure 4.4: The final belief structure that merges multi-agent information
representing an object. After being verified, the assertive part of the tutor’s
utterance is merged into the structure, which creates a learning opportunity.
The green colour denotes the changes in the structure during this stage.
4.3 Belief Based Cross-Modal Learning
One of the main purposes of George is to demonstrate certain learning
paradigms that allow a cognitive system to improve its knowledge about its
surroundings by exploiting information from different sources. In this pro-
cess, the ability of the belief layer to manage, relate, and merge multi-modal
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and multi-agent information plays a vital role. From the belief standpoint,
learning mechanisms exploit differences in information in beliefs pertaining
to different modal or epistemological categories, but representing the same
physical entity. Successful binding or reference resolution is therefore a key
precondition for any kind of cross-modal learning.
At this point, it is necessary that we distinguish between two distinct
types of cross-modal learning (the Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning
distinguishes three such types [38]). In Chapter 2, we defined cross-modal
learning as the process of improving the ability to merge (bind) multi-modal
information. To implement such a process, a system needs special learners
that learn how to associate concepts from different modalities. This kind of
learning is described as cross-modal learning on higher level of abstraction in
[38]. However, the same term may also refer to mechanisms exploiting multi-
modal information for feeding modal learners, i.e. weakly coupled cross-modal
learning according to [38]. We can apply the latter meaning to the learning
mechanisms in George scenarios.
All learning paradigms that George implements try to obtain and use
tutor’s information about visible objects for learning visual concepts. In
most cases, the tutor provides this information explicitly, as we saw in the
example in Section 4.1.1. In these cases, the learning act is executed as
a deliberate action issued by the planner, hence in a goal-driven fashion.
We can categorize such learning mechanism as explicit learning. George’s
learning mechanisms fall into this category.
In contrast, implicit learning in principle completely bypasses planning
and motivation, and occurs in a pure data-driven fashion (the difference
between implicit and explicit learning is also explained in [45]). Implicit
learning exploits the difference in information between assumed and merged
beliefs to update modal visual concepts. Depending on the information that
was merged, and the type of process that performs information merging (see
Section 4.2), the difference can be (i) in the property confidence and (ii) in
the property quality (e.g. as depicted in Figure 4.4). In the former case, the
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system has to have a difference threshold that triggers learning. In the latter
case, the system can perform both, the learning of the right concept in the
merged belief, and the unlearning of the wrong concept in the assumed belief.
Of course, before the learning action takes place, the property information
in the merged belief has to be translated back to modal symbols.
An important question when implementing implicit learning is when to
trigger it. It would not be advisable simply to trigger the implicit learning
after each merging, since this could result in relearning the same information
several times. A better strategy is to compare the new merged belief with
the old one, and react only when there is a change in the quality of merged
information, or if confidence of the new information raises the confidence
difference above the threshold.
Another problem concerning implicit learning occurs when the implicit
learning is combined with the explicit learning. After the assertive infor-
mation is used for learning, it is verified, and consequently merged into the
merged belief. This can trigger the implicit learning, which means that the
same information is used for learning twice. We can avoid this problem by
simply restrict implicit learning to the restrictive information only (as is also
the case in [45]). This means that the implicit learning is triggered after
the first merging of the verified information, only. When used as a supple-
mentary learning mechanism in combination with the explicit learning, it is
important to adequately tune the effects of both learning mechanisms. The
effect of implicit learning should be less pronounced, since it occurs more
often in general, and not in a deliberate manner.
4.3.1 Learning Mechanisms in George
In this section, we describe the four mechanisms that govern the learning
part of George’s behaviour. They are all deliberate – trying to learn about
properties explicitly. Save for situated autonomous learning, they are all
based on the interaction with the tutor. They differ over which agent has
the initiative in the interaction, and over whether the initiative stems from
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the extrospection (of the situation), or from introspection.
Situated Tutor-Driven Learning
The situated tutor-driven learning can be regarded as the most classic ex-
ample of explicit learning. We refer to this case, when a tutor takes the
initiative and explicitly tries to teach the robot something about the visible
objects. There are two necessary conditions for such a learning act: (i) the
visual subsystem detects an object and processes its visual features, and (ii)
the information provided by the tutor is successfully attributed to the same
object. This results in the creation of communicative intention containing
both a reference to the object in question, and the inferred desired effect of
the tutor’s utterance (i.e., the corresponding change in the robot’s private
belief about the object). The intention structure is the prerequisite for the
motivation subsystem to create a planning goal for visual learning. The goal
will be committed to planning and execution only if the expected informa-
tion gain for the learning action (provided by the visual subsystem) is high
enough. Since both prerequisites for the learning are present (visual infor-
mation from the private belief and a label from the intention), the planner
generates a trivial plan – a sequence of learning actions, one for each property
provided by the tutor. The execution subsystem triggers the visual learner in
the Visual SA to update the internal visual models. This action also results
in an updated model status belief, which maintains key meta-information
about the visual models.
Situated Autonomous Learning
When a merged belief contains only the information provided by the vision
subsystem, and this information is deemed reliable (the visual concept has
been recognised with high a confidence), the motivation subsystem triggers
an autonomous learning cycle. The models of the corresponding visual con-
cepts are automatically updated, also resulting in an updated model status
belief. In the case of a very confident recognition, such an update is not nec-
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essary because the current representation can describe the object perfectly
well. However, when the recognition is slightly less reliable, it makes sense to
adapt the knowledge to the perceived object, thus increasing the confidence
of recognition of similar objects in the future. There is, however, a persistent
danger of incorporating erroneously recognised information into the models
in such an automated way; the system should therefore behave very con-
servatively, and only update the knowledge when the recognition is reliable
enough, otherwise it should verify its decision by consulting the tutor.
Strictly speaking, situated autonomous learning does not categorize as
cross-modal learning, since it involves information from visual modality, only.
Since there is no explicit teaching intent from the tutor, it could be in prin-
ciple implemented in a data-driven fashion, as implicit learning.
Situated Tutor-Assisted Learning
Depending on its current ability to recognise a specific object, George can ask
the tutor a question about the object’s properties. In this case, the merged
belief that motivation acts upon contains only information from the private
belief. To fully exploit its question, George asks about the object property
with the highest information gain (as described in Section 3.1.3), expecting
that the corresponding model would benefit most from the requested infor-
mation. In the absence of attributed beliefs, the planner generates a plan to
ask questions about missing information. The execution subsystem generates
a corresponding intention, which the dialogue subsystem uses to synthesize
a suitable utterance. Depending on confidence in the recognition results,
the planner can choose between polar questions (that can be answered with
‘yes’ or ‘no’), when recognition confidence is high (e.g. R: “Is the colour of
the compact object red?”), and open questions (that require a label for the
answer), when confidence is low (e.g. R: “What is the colour of the compact
object?”). If the robot is unable to unambiguously verbally refer to the par-
ticular object, the planner can resort to the robot’s arm. A common ground
with the tutor is established by pointing at the object. Pointing reflects in
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the uttered question accordingly (e.g. R: “What is the colour this object?”).
After the tutor answers, the workflow is similar to tutor-driven learning.
Non-Situated Tutor-Assisted Learning
In non-situated tutor-assisted learning paradigm, the robot tries to obtain
new learning samples by making a request to the human tutor (e.g. R: “Could
you show me something red?”). The robot relies on introspection to influence
the quality of potential new objects. Introspection of property models is
performed in the visual subsystem (Visual SA). The results are propagated
to the belief layer in the form of epistemic structure model status, which
contains key meta-information about the models maintained by the visual
learner. The system can use the information gain to estimate the reliability
of available models, without relating to any particular objects in the scene.
Chapter 5
Experiments
This chapter is divided in two parts. Section 5.1 describes the off-line exper-
iments that were performed on a prototype binding system that was imple-
mented according the principles described in Chapter 2. Section 5.2 describes
the evaluation of the cognitive system described in Chapters 3 and 4.
5.1 Evaluation of the Binding Prototype
5.1.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented a prototype of our binding and cross-modal learning system
(see Chapter 2) in Alchemy1 [23]. Our experimental database comprehended
three modalities: vision, language and affordance. The visual modality had
13 features in total: six for object colour, three for the general shape (com-
pact, elongated, flat) and four for the geometric shape. Language had 13
features matching the visual features and eight features for object type (e.g.
book, box, apple, etc.). The affordance modality had three features describ-
ing the possible outcomes of pushing an object. Overall, we had 54 fully
featured object prototypes.
1Alchemy is a software package providing various inference and learning algorithms
based on Markov logic networks.
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We designed the learning samples to mimic the robot interaction with a
human tutor (like in the George scenario), where the human was showing
objects to the robot, describing their properties. The learning samples were
organized in small batches. Each learning sequence consisted of 80 learning
batches. We generated the batches randomly, with balanced appearances of
object prototypes.
We designed 30 test-cases for evaluating the binding process. In each test-
case, we had three visual percepts and one non-visual percept. The binder
had to determine which visual percept, if any at all, the non-visual percept
belonged to (i.e. four possible choices: one for each visual percept and one for
no corresponding percept). Of the four possible choices, one was always more
obvious than the others, and thus deemed correct. The possibility that the
system inferred as the most probable was considered its binding choice, if the
probability exceeded 30%. If the probability of the most probable choice was
union = {U1, U2, U3, U4}
perFeat(P1, V Red), perFeat(P1, V F lat), perFeat(P1, V Cylindrical),
perFeat(P2, V Blue), perFeat(P2, V Compact), perFeat(P2, V Spherical),
perFeat(P3, V Green), perFeat(P3, V Elongated), perFeat(P3, V Conical),
uniPer(U1, P1), uniPer(U2, P2), uniPer(U3, P3)
perFeat(P4, LRed), perFeat(P4, LF lat), perFeat(P4, LCylindrical)
uniPer(u, P4)?
Figure 5.1: An example of an easy test-case. We can see that objects rep-
resented with visual percepts (P1, P2 and P3) differ in all types of visual
features. The system needs to determine which union the fourth, linguistic
percept belongs to.
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less than 30%, the case was automatically considered not correctly resolved.
The test-cases varied in their level of difficulty, and were divided in three
categories:
• the easy test-cases featured distinct features for visual percepts and
complete information for all percepts (each percept had a value for
each feature type belonging to its modality, see Figure 5.1),
• the medium test-cases could have features shared by several percepts
or incomplete percept information,
• the hard test-cases had both incomplete information and feature shar-
ing (see Figure 5.2).
union = {U1, U2, U3, U4}
perFeat(P1, V Red), perFeat(P1, V Compact), perFeat(P1, V Conical),
perFeat(P2, V Green), perFeat(P2, V Compact), perFeat(P2, V Spherical),
perFeat(P3, V Green), perFeat(P3, V F lat), perFeat(P3, V Conical),
uniPer(U1, P1), uniPer(U2, P2), uniPer(U3, P3)
perFeat(P4, LApple)
uniPer(u, P4)?
Figure 5.2: An example of a difficult test-case. We can see that the objects
represented with visual percepts (P1, P2 and P3) are less distinct than in
the easier test-case (Figure 5.1), and with some incomplete information. The
system has to find out which visual percept could be an apple. The visual
training samples for apples consisted of compact and spherical percepts of
red or green colour.
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The tests were performed several times during the learning process, in inter-
vals of four batches.
We performed our evaluation with three inference methods: Belief propa-
gation [29, 30] and two Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling meth-
ods – MC-SAT [31] and Gibbs sampling [12]. In both MCMC methods, the
number of sampling steps was limited to 2000 (with additional 100 burn-in
samples), while the maximum number of iterations for Belief propagation
was 2000.
5.1.2 Experimental Results and Evaluation
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the average rate of correct binding choices over 20
randomly generated learning sequences for all three inference methods. In all
cases, the binding rate tends to grow and converge with the growing number
of samples, though with some oscillations. The oscillations are more pro-
nounced for the difficult test samples, especially in the case of the MC-SAT
method. The MC-SAT method has also a lower correctness rate compared
to Gibbs sampling and Belief propagation. This can be explained by the
slower convergence rate per sampling step for the MC-SAT sampler, which
is, however more than compensated by its speed (approximately ten times
faster per step compared to the other two methods).
Analysing the results example by example, we identified several issues
hindering the system performance. The subset of possible associations rep-
resented with the binding rules does not include many-to-one feature associ-
ations (e.g. red, compact, cylindrical ⇒ colacan). Such associations would
be especially beneficial for situations reflected by certain difficult test-cases
(see figure 5.2). Of course, to prevent combinatorial explosion, the addition
of many-to-one associations would require quite a different (a much more
selective) conceptual grounding strategy.
The feature types with less members are underestimated, e.g. both types
of shapes with the respect to the colour type, which reflects the fact that
is less likely for the same colour to appear in two or more percepts in the
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learning samples. This makes colour associations more distinctive than shape
associations, and is in general in perfect accordance with [40]. In our case,
however, there are situations, where this principle can represent a problem.
We can see an example of such situation in figure 5.5, where a very distinctive
colour association overweights the shape mismatch, which results in a wrong
binding result.
A portion of test-cases (10%) represented situations where no existing
visual percept matched the non-visual percept, which should have resulted
in a separate percept union for the non-visual percept. In all test-cases of
this kind the mismatching feature pairs outnumbered the matching ones in
all potential two-percept unions (a scenario where, e.g. just one mismatching
feature pair is enough to deem the percepts not compatible is difficult to
formulate in pure probabilistic logic). In general, such situations are harder
to resolve, since the system has to rely on segregative rules, only. A correct
resolution requires the segregative associations to outweigh the aggregative
Figure 5.3: Experimental results: the average overall rate of correct binding
choices relative to the number of training batches (10 randomly generated
learning sequences were used). The green, yellow and red lines denote the
three inference methods: MC-SAT, Belief propagation and Gibbs sampling,
respectively.
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associations in all plausible percept pair combinations. The correctness rate
of these test-cases is lower and increases at a slower rate with more pro-
nounced oscillations.
At this point, we have to emphasize again the off-line nature of these
experiments. In this experimental setup, the system was forced to make
a decision even in a very uncertain situation (e.g. in a situation where the
probabilities of two most probable choices were very close). In contrast, in an
integrated cognitive system, the binding mechanism would handle uncertain
situations differently, e.g. by triggering a behaviour that would try to clarify
the situation (like described in Section 3.1.7). This would, of course, involve
other cognitive mechanisms. In this sense, such off-line evaluation can not
show the real value of a cognitive mechanism.
Figure 5.4: Experimental results by test-case difficulty: the average rate
of correct binding choices relative to the number of training batches. The
green, yellow and red lines denote the easy, medium and hard test samples,
respectively.
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union = {U1, U2, U3, U4}
perFeat(P1, V Red), perFeat(P1, V Compact), perFeat(P1, V Spherical),
perFeat(P2, V Red), perFeat(P2, V Elongated), perFeat(P2, V Cylindrical),
perFeat(P3, V F lat), perFeat(P3, V Cylindrical),
uniPer(U1, P1), uniPer(U2, P2), uniPer(U3, P3)
perFeat(P4, LRed), perFeat(P4, LF lat)
uniPer(U2, P4)
Figure 5.5: An example of wrong binding. Because we have six possible
colour values and only three for the general shape, the colour features are
more distinctive. Hence, the colour associations have more impact on the
binding process, which can sometimes result in wrong binding. In the case
above, U3 is the correct union choice for percept P4. Instead, the system
chooses U2 based on the red colour
5.2 Evaluation of George’s Behaviour
The main goal of the experiments described in this section is to evaluate the
behaviour of George in a real world environment, as well as the performance
of the system as a whole. More specifically, we were interested in its interac-
tion with its typical environment setting (i.e. the objects in its surroundings
and a human tutor), with a particular emphasis on the mechanisms for inter-
active, situated learning. As these mechanisms depend on the ability of the
system to merge multi-modal and multi-agent data (i.e. the belief layer), the
experiments also represent the proof of concept for the approaches described
in this work. It is not superfluous to emphasize at this point that the pur-
pose of these on-line experiments was not the evaluation of individual modal
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recognisers and learners.
To illustrate the behaviour of the system during the learning process, we
first present an example of interaction between a human tutor and the robot.
Then we present the quantitative results, obtained by observing the robot’s
behaviour in a similar scenario.
5.2.1 An Example of Human-Robot Interaction
In this example of interaction, a human tutor and the robot engage in situ-
ated dialogue in order to improve robot’s knowledge about visual concepts,
such as colour, shape and object types. During the interaction, the robot
aims to recognise and describe the objects on a table. The human can add,
move or remove objects from the table, while teaching the robot about their
properties. There can be up to five objects on the table at any time.
Initially, it is the tutor that has to drive the learning. But after a while,
the robot can take the initiative, involving the tutor in his learning effort as
he sees fit. Perhaps the most critical part of such interaction is establishing a
common ground about the content of the scene. In each communicative act,
the agents must explicitly or implicitly agree on which object they are talking
about. Hence, the ability of merging multi-agent information is critical in
such interaction.
At any time, the tutor can decide to ask questions about the objects in the
scene, to see what the robot has learned so far. In this sense, the goal of the
learning interaction is to achieve such a maturity of robot’s representations
that would make a correct description of the scene possible.
Let us consider an empty table. The tutor puts an object on the table.
Applying its attention mechanism, the robot looks at it.
H: Do you know what this is?
R: No.
In the beginning, the robot knows nothing yet about any object. Situated
tutor-driven learning is therefore imperative during these initial stages of the
interaction, since the robot needs to initialise reliably its representations.
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H: This is a red object.
R: Let me see. OK.
With this information, George can initiate its visual model of redness. After
several similar learning steps, the acquired representations become reliable
enough to allow George to reference verbally individual objects, and also
understand references made by the human. This makes the whole interaction
much easier. For example, the human can now ask situated questions even
when there are more than one objects in the scene.
H: What colour is the coke can?
R: It is red.
When enough of the models are reliable, George can take the initiative, and
drive the learning by asking questions himself. It will typically do this when
he detects a new object in the scene, but can not reliably recognise all of
its properties. In this case, the robot resorts to the situated tutor-assisted
learning mechanism. In general, there are two possible kinds of gaps in
robot’s knowledge. If a property does not appear to fit any of the current
models, the robot can asks the tutor to provide more information about the
novel property with an open question:
R: What colour is this object?
H: It is yellow.
R: OK.
In the second case, the robot is able to associate the object property with
a particular model, but the recognition is not very reliable. The robot can
ask for clarification with a polar question:
R: Is this red?
H: No. This is yellow.
R: OK.
After receiving the answer, the robot corrects the representation of red (by
unlearning the current sample from the model), and updates the representa-
tion of yellow.
If the recognition of an object property is somewhat more reliable, but
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still not perfectly reliable, George can update the models without asking any
questions, employing the mechanism for situated autonomous learning. Since
there is no external verification in this kind of learning behaviour, George
tends to be very conservative, when using it.
The motivation subsystem makes George attend and process all the ob-
jects in the scene that were detected so far. When its knowledge about those
objects is complete (i.e. knowledge about perceived instances, not necessar-
ily knowledge on conceptual level2), it further explores the scene by looking
around for new objects. If no additional objects are found, it resorts to intro-
spection (the non-situated tutor-assisted learning mechanism) to detect gaps
in its knowledge. It tries to attend potential knowledge gaps by asking the
tutor to show an object with a particular property.
R: Please, show me something blue.
H puts an object at the table.
H: This is a blue object.
R: Thank you.
George prefers to refer to objects verbally, but it can do that also by
pointing. Let us assume that the tutor empties the table, and then puts two
new objects on the table. George detects and attends both. If it is able to
reliably recognise and verbalise a distinctive set of attributes in both objects,
it can refer to them verbally.
R: Is the Pepsi can blue?
H: Yes, it is.
R: Thank you.
However, if no verbal distinction is possible, the robot resorts to pointing.
R points at an object.
R: What colour is this object?
2By merging private and attributed information about objects, the robot is able to
make sense of the scene. It is then able to talk and ask questions about the scene, even
without understanding well the concepts that it uses to describe it. In the sense of Section
2.3, we could say that in the absence of own reliable knowledge, the robot is able to
conceptually ground its representations to the knowledge of another agent.
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H: It is yellow.
R: Thank you.
George uses the same method for generating references when requesting a
clarification after an ambiguous question.
In such mixed-initiative dialogue, George continuously improves its rep-
resentations of basic visual concepts. After a while, George can successfully
recognise the acquired concepts to provide reliable answers to a variety of
questions.
H: Do you know what is this?
R: It is a blue object.
H: What is the green object?
R: It is an ice tea bottle.
H: Which shape is it?
R: It is elongated.
5.2.2 Experimental Setup
It is very difficult to evaluate consistently such a complex, heterogeneous and
asynchronous system. The system can exhibit different patterns of behaviour
based on the visual input, and the timing and order of interactions, as well
as the information provided by the tutor. To overcome this, we created
a controlled experiment where we were able to vary the values of different
variables, and systematically measure the performance of the system in terms
of achieved expected system behaviour. We created an interaction scenario to
invoke all of the different behaviours implemented in the system, involving
different objects, placed on different positions. We ran this scenario ten times
with the real robot, compared the resulting behaviour with the behaviour
expected based on our design, and measured the rate of success. In this
section we report the results, and analyse the system performance.
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Scenario Setup
The scenario setup was similar to the one shown in Figure 3.1. We con-
strained the surface, where the tutor could place objects, to ten fixed loca-
tions across the table. These locations were unknown to the system. The
area that the ten locations formed was wider than the camera view, hence
the system had to use the pan-tilt unit to cover it.
Figure 5.6: Objects used in the experiment.
We used 18 ordinary household objects. Each of them had one predom-
inant colour (figure 5.6). We considered three concepts (colour, shape and
type). Every iteration of the experiment was characterized by:
• Objects oi: three objects selected among the objects depicted in Fig-
ure 5.6.
• Places pi: three places selected among the ten predefined places, where
the objects were positioned.
• Concepts cj ∈ {colour, shape, type}.
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• Concept values: v1i ∈ {red, green, blue, yellow, ...}; v2i ∈ {compact,
elongated}, v3i ∈ {milk box, banana, corn flakes, pepsi can, ...},
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the index of the individual object, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
the index of one of the concepts.
Actions
The experimental interaction consisted of a fixed sequence of actions (script)
performed by the tutor. Table 5.1 presents the actions available to the tu-
tor. During the interaction, the robot was expected to reply with the actions
presented in Table 5.2. The scenario did not include all actions the robot
was able to perform, nor all of the tutor’s actions that were supported. Nev-
ertheless, this set of actions could support all mechanisms of behaviour we
intended to test, while it was sufficiently constrained to facilitate a consistent
and controlled experiment.
Table 5.1: Tutor’s actions in the experiment.
action description and example
put(o,p) Put the object o at the place p.
tellThis(v) Tell the concept value v of the current object.
H: This is a red object.
askValue(c,v) Ask about the value of the concept c of the object
referenced by another concept value v.
H: What shape is the yellow object?
answerPolar Answer a polar question.
H: Yes.
answerOpen(v) Answer an open question.
H: It is yellow.
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Table 5.2: A set of expected robot actions in the experiment.
action description and example
attend(o) Look at an object and analyse its properties.
askThisOpen(c) Ask an open question about the current object.
R: What colour is this object?
askThisPolar(v) Ask a polar question about the current object.
R: Is this a mug?
update(o,c,v) Updates the model of the concept c with the value v
using the features extracted from the object o.
lookAround Looks around the scene.
askForObject(v) Asks for an object with the concept value v.
R: Please, show me something green.
answerValue(v) Answers the question with the attribute value v.
R: It is a mug.
askIfValue(v) Verifies the referent using an attribute value v.
R: Do you mean the coffee box?
point(o) Points at an object o.
askIfPoint Verifies the referent by pointing.
R: Do you mean this one?
Interaction Script
Table 5.3 presents the interaction script that was used in the experiment.
The script covers all the mechanisms of behaviour presented in Sections 3.3
and 4.3.1. Non-indented lines represent the tutor’s actions, while the lines
with expected robot actions are indented. We repeated this script ten times.
For each script iteration, the object that we used, the locations that we put
the object in, and the concepts that we discussed, were selected randomly. In
other words, we varied the variables o, p, c, and v. However, in each iteration,
we had to start with a suitable configuration of pre-learned property models
that would allow the robot to act according to the script (e.g., a certain
maturity of the property model is required to ask a modal question). As we
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have already pointed out, in these experiments, we are not concerned about
the quality of the models the robot manages to build during the interaction.
Table 5.3: Scenario script.
1: put(o1, p1), put(o2, p2), 20: askValue(c, v) not requiring
p1 and p2 are far apart disambiguation
2: attend(o1) 21: answerValue(v)
3: analyseAsk(o1) 22: askValue(c, v) requiring
4: answer(o1, c, v) verbal disambiguation
5: update(o1, c, v) 23: askIfValue(v)
6: lookAround 24: answerPolar
7: attend(o2) 25: answerValue(v)
8: analyseAsk(o2) 26: askValue(c, v) requiring
9: answer(o2, c, v) disambiguation by pointing
10: update(o2, c, v) 27: point(o)
11: lookAround 28: askIfPoint
12: askForObject(v) 29: answerPolar
13: put(o3, p3) 30: answerValue(v)
14: attend(o3)
15: tellThis(v) where:
16: update(o3, c, v) analyseAsk(o):={askThisOpen(c) ∨
17: analyseAsk(o3) askThisPolar(v) ∨ /}
18: answer(o3, c, v) answer(o, c, v):={answerOpen(v) ∨
19: update(o3, c, v) answerPolar ∨ / ∨ tellThis(v)}
Actions analyseAsk(o) and answer(o, c, v) in Table 5.3 have multiple pos-
sibilities (‘/’ means ‘do nothing’). The robot would choose its reaction to
the current observation based on its reliability (e.g. what kind of question to
ask, or whether to simply update the knowledge). When reacting to a ques-
tion, the tutor would also tune his choice to the context. Either by simply
answering the question, or by ignoring it and perhaps explicitly providing
the desired information (e.g. when reacting to a polar question).
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Each session begins with tutor placing two objects on the table. They are
positioned sufficiently apart, so that only one of them is in the current camera
view. The robot first analyses the visible object. Depending on results of
the analysis, it may update the knowledge autonomously, or request some
additional information from the tutor. After updating the models, the robot
looks around in search for more objects. When it finds the second object, it
attends to this object in a similar way. After the robot observes that there
are no other objects on the tabletop, it asks for a new one, possibly with the
property that it is currently most interested in. After the tutor complies, the
robot again attends to the new object in a similar fashion.
Figure 5.7: A typical scene from the robot’s viewpoint.
At the end of each session, the tutor verifies the robot’s knowledge by
asking three questions about the objects on the table. The first question is
unambiguous, and the robot is expected to answer immediately. For exam-
ple, let us consider the scene depicted in Figure 5.7. If the robot is able to
recognise the colours of the objects, this question might be H: “What shape
is the blue object?”. The second question is ambiguous, but it can be dis-
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ambiguated by referring to another object property (e.g. H: “What shape is
the yellow object?”, R: “Do you mean the tea box?”). In the third case, the
disambiguation can only be performed by pointing (e.g., H: “What is the
yellow object?”, R:“Do you mean this one?”). In all three cases, the robot is
expected to perform the adequate actions to answer the question.
5.2.3 Experimental Results and Evaluation
Table 5.4 presents the results of the experiments. The results are grouped by
mechanisms of behaviour (see Sections 3.3 and 4.3.1). For each mechanism,
the table lists the lines from the script (Table 5.3) implementing it. In the last
two columns, we can see how many times the specific actions were expected
to be triggered (#exp), and how many times these actions were actually
successfully executed (#exec). We evaluated the system performance by
comparing the numbers in both columns.
Table 5.4: Experimental results - expected and executed actions.
mechanism lines #exp. #exec.
Attention mechanism 2;7;14 30 30
Situated tutor-driven learning 5;10;16;19 18 18
Situated autonomous learning 3,5;8,10;17,19 9 9
Situated tutor-assisted learning 3,5;8,10;17,19 32 31
Exploring the scene 6;11 20 20
Non-sit. tutor-assisted learning 12 16 16
Answering tutor’s requests 1 21 10 10
Answering tutor’s requests 2 23,25 10 10
Answering tutor’s requests 3 27,28,30 10 7
The performance of all learning mechanisms was almost impeccable, with
only one learning failure in 75 cases. The system also exhibited a good per-
formance for its other mechanisms of behaviour. The attention mechanism
was triggered whenever expected. The detection of the objects was also very
76 CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTS
reliable (in the sense that it was correct when expected so). The system
explored the scene whenever it was necessary.
Most of the tutor’s questions were answered as expected, especially when
no disambiguation was necessary, or when the robot could disambiguate the
question verbally. The only problematic mechanisms was the disambigua-
tion with pointing. On two occasions, the execution of the pointing action
failed (along with the subsequent retries). Although the arm did point at
the object, the execution mechanism was not able to report the execution
completion and success to the planner. In one iteration, instead of pointing,
the robot tried to disambiguate by the same property type that had been the
object of the question (e.g. H:“What colour is the mug?”, R:“Do you mean
the red one?”). In a normal conversation, this could have been even consid-
ered appropriate, e.g. as a form of tentative answer. In our case, we took
it as a failure, since the system had not exhibited the expected behaviour.
George is actually designed to give tentative answers, but in different forms
(e.g. “It might be red.”), and under different circumstances (e.g. when it is
not sure about the model).
Further analysing the mechanisms that rely on merged information, we
could see that the data-merging processes in the belief layer worked as ex-
pected for all evaluated mechanisms, in all iterations, even when the outcome
of the whole mechanism was not as expected.
In general, we can conclude that the system mostly exhibited the expected
behaviour, and the observed failures were due to undiagnosed problems in
our software, rather than problems with principles underlying our approach.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we addressed a critical problem of any cognitive architecture
aiming to operate in a realistic environment – the problem of bridging the se-
mantic gap between lower, multi-modal cognitive layers, and higher, a-modal
cognition. To bridge the semantic gap, a cognitive system has to be able
to relate and merge information from different sources, to produce unified
representations that can be used by higher cognitive processes. In order to
make this process more flexible, the system must also include mechanisms for
adapting and improving the cross-modal knowledge that is used for merging
information.
We approached this problem by first developing a theoretical model of
binding and cross-modal learning. We assumed an open and uncertain envi-
ronment, where the system has to cope continuously with uncertainty and
novelty in its perceptions. This implied a probabilistic approach to our mod-
elling. We based our problem definition on Agrawal’s problem of association
rule learning, which we extended with the notions of modalities, percepts and
percept unions. We described binding as the optimization of mapping a per-
cept configuration to a possible union configuration based on accumulated
cross-modal knowledge. By these definitions, we formulated a probabilis-
tic binding mechanism and a cross-modal learner in Markov Logic Networks.
We discussed a possible way of integrating such a mechanism into a cognitive
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architecture.
Another aim of our research to was to develop an approach to integra-
tion of our principles and methods into a real cognitive system. To this
end, we have co-developed George, a prototype robot designed to continu-
ously learn about its environment in a situated dialogue with a human tutor.
George is based on a distributed asynchronous architecture, which facilitates
a meaningful integration of several components that implement various cog-
nitive processes. This results in a coherent system, capable of meaningful
behaviour. Our instantiation of this architecture, i.e. George, focuses on
several mechanisms of behaviour that facilitate interactive learning.
Instrumental for the learning mechanisms, but also crucial to the cognitive
system in general, is the belief layer. The belief layer merges multi-modal
and multi-agent information into unified representations that can be used by
higher cognitive processes. The belief layer in George represents our exercise
in integration of the principles of binding and cross-modal learning into a
real cognitive system. In fact, though not modelled exactly as cross-modal
binding, the belief layer incorporates most of its principles. At the same time,
it also expands upon them by including methods of managing multi-agent
information. An important association mechanism (akin to binding) in the
belief layer is reference resolution. Reference resolution relates robot’s own
perceptions of a physical entity to the human description of the same entity.
We validated our approach with two sets of experiments. First, we eval-
uated in an off-line fashion a prototype binding system on our experimental
database. The results show how the binding ability of the system increases
with the number of samples, and how all this relates to the difficulty of
the binding tasks. The results also point out some specific problems of the
method that need to be addressed in the future. However, it is important
to stress again that these were off-line experiments, where the system was
forced to make a decision even in an uncertain situation. When part of
an integrated cognitive system, many of such situations would be handled
differently, e.g. by resorting to a clarifying behaviour that employs several
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additional cognitive mechanisms.
The on-line experiments performed on the George prototype represent
the second part of validation of our approach – evaluation as a part of a real
cognitive architecture. The focus of these experiments was on the evaluation
of George’s behaviour, with an emphasis on the mechanisms for interactive,
situated learning. The experiments took place in a controlled real world en-
vironment, where George and a human tutor engaged in a situated dialogue,
according to an interaction scenario. We evaluated the performance by com-
paring the actual behaviour of the robot to the expected behaviour (from the
scenario). The results confirmed the ability of the system to actively pursue
knowledge in a situated dialogue, with all of its learning mechanisms. The
results also showed a correct performance of the belief layer, which functioned
as expected in all situations.
We can conclude that the experiments confirmed the validity of our ap-
proach, both off-line and as an integral part of a cognitive architecture. Of
course, despite all its architectural and technical complexity, George is still
a very simple cognitive system in terms of supported behavioural and per-
ceptual capabilities. It features one real perceptual modality, only. We ‘bor-
rowed’ the second modality from the dialogue subsystem, though the rela-
tion between both information sources can be described more appropriately
as multi-agent. A cognitive system with two or more perceptual modalities
would surely represent an additional challenge in integration efforts, but also
a great opportunity for further validation of our approach. In this sense, we
perhaps missed an opportunity to treat the attentive part of George’s vision
as a separate modality1. In a similar fashion, multiple foreign agents would
increase the challenge for the belief layer, especially in the epistemological
sense.
Another possible future task could be to explore the possibilities of ex-
1In the present case, a sort of data merging from both visual sources actually occurs,
even in a deliberate fashion, involving motivation and planning to move the camera, but
within a single representation or percept, using the location of the item as the only clue.
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tending the structure of cross-modal knowledge database with more complex
rules. Of course, to accommodate more complex rules, we would also require
more sophisticated learning methods. The present cognitive system is far
from exploiting the full potential of MLN, and it is our firm opinion that
MLN has a great potential for probabilistic cognitive modelling. Hence, a
path worth pursuing might be to involve MLN in modelling and integration
of other cognitive processes, as well.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Povzetek magistrske naloge v
slovenskem jeziku
A.1 Uvod
Spoznavne sisteme lahko najucˇinkoviteje opiˇsemo kot sisteme, ki na pod-
lagi razumevanja informacij sprejemajo premiˇsljene odlocˇitve. To dosezˇejo z
organiziranem izvajanjem spoznavnih operacij, kot so prepoznavanje, anal-
iziranje, povezovanje, odlocˇanje, nacˇrtovanje, itd. Za umetne spoznave sis-
teme, ki delujejo v realnem okolju, je torej nujna sposobnost zbiranja in
razumevanja relevantnih informacij o svoji okolici, podlagi katerih se lahko
lahko samostojno odlocˇajo ali nacˇrtujejo svoje nadaljnje dejavnosti. V splosˇnem
lahko spoznavni sistemi zbirajo informacije o okolici na dva nacˇina: (i) z inter-
pretacijo podatkov iz senzorjev, oziroma s percepcijo, ali (ii) z interpretacijo
podatkov drugega agenta, cˇe je sistem sposoben komunikacije z njim. Per-
cepcija je seveda bolj neposreden in ucˇinkovitejˇsi od obeh nacˇinov. Vendar pa
za uspesˇno percepcijo sistem potrebuje ustrezno konceptualno znanje, ki ga
mora tudi nadgrajevati, cˇe deluje v odprtem in dinamicˇnem okolju. Cˇe ima
sistem vecˇ razlicˇnih senzorjev in vecˇ podsistemov, ki interpretirajo senzorske
podatke, govorimo o vecˇmodalnosti. V tem primeru za delovanje potrebuje
tudi cˇezmodalno znanje, s katerim povezuje informacije, ki izhajajo iz ra-
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zlicˇnih tipov zaznav. Tovrstno znanje dopolnjuje s cˇezmodalnim ucˇenjem.
Na ta nacˇin sistem tudi premosˇcˇa semanticˇni prepad med nizˇjenivojskimi in
viˇsjenivojskimi spoznavnimi procesi.
Spoznavni sistem lahko s svojim vedenjem nacˇrtno pripomore k ucˇinko-
vitejˇsem ucˇenju. Cˇe se v njegovi okolici nahaja cˇlovek, s katerim lahko ko-
municira, predstavlja to prilozˇnost, da s pogovorom hitreje dopolni svoje do-
jemanje (oz. percepcijo) okolice, kot tudi svoje konceptualno znanje. Seveda
pa vedenjski mehanizmi za interaktivno ucˇenje sˇe povecˇujejo kompleksnost
podsistemov za vecˇmodalno zdruzˇevanje informacij.
A.2 Cˇezmodalno povezovanje in ucˇenje
V drugem poglavju opisujemo teoreticˇni model cˇezmodalnega povezovanja
in ucˇenja. Predpostavili smo odprto in nepredvidljivo okolje, kjer mora
sistem biti kos negotovim percepcijam in novim konceptom. Zato smo se
odlocˇili za verjetnostno modeliranje. Najprej smo definirali problem. Za
osnovo smo vzeli Agrawalov problem ucˇenja asociativnih pravil, ki smo ga
razsˇirili s pojmom modalnosti. Vsaka modalnost prispeva svojo percepcijo
elementov v okolici, sistem pa mora percepcije pravilno zdruzˇiti v enoten
opis okolja. Cˇe so percepcije sestavljene iz vecˇ elementov, je mogocˇih vecˇ
opisov. Cˇezmodalno povezovanje smo definirali kot iskanje optimalnega opisa
na podlagi cˇezmodalnega znanja. Na podlagi te definicije smo formulirali
mehanizem verjetnostnega cˇezmodalnega povezovanja in ucˇenja v markovskih
logicˇnih omrezˇjih. Poglavje zakljucˇujemo z razpravo o integraciji takega meh-
anizma v spoznavno arhitekturo.
A.3 Prototip spoznavnega sistema George
Pristop iz drugega poglavja smo hoteli ovrednotiti kot del delujocˇega spoz-
navnega sistema. V tretjem poglavjiu opisujemo prototip takega sistema,
ki smo ga v sodelovanju s partnerji razvili prav z namenom preizkusˇanja
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skupnega delovanja razlicˇnih spoznavnih mehanizmov. George je inteligen-
ten robot, ki z opazovanjem predmetov v svoji okolici in s pomocˇjo pogovora
s cˇlovekom nenehno dopolnjuje svoje konceptualno znanje o lastnostih pred-
metov. Osnovo sistema predstavlja distribuirana arhitekturna shema (Cog-
nitive Architecture Schema), ki z asinhrono integracijo spoznavnih kompo-
nent omogocˇa razvoj koherentnih spoznavnih arhitektur. Nasˇa udejanitev te
arhitekturne sheme, torej George, se osredotocˇa na vedenjske mehanizme, ki
omogocˇajo interaktivno ucˇenje.
A.4 Premosˇcˇanje semanticˇnega prepada
V tem poglavju podrobneje opiˇsemo podsistem prepricˇanj, ki je pomemben
del spoznavnega sistema George, saj premosˇcˇa semanticˇni prepad med nje-
govimni modalnimi in nemodalnimi spoznavnimi procesi. Prav tako je to
kljucˇni del vecˇine njegovih vedenjskih mehanizmov, predvsem tistih za inter-
aktivno ucˇenje, hkrati pa predstavlja tudi materializacijo nasˇih nacˇel inte-
gracije cˇezmodalnega povezovanja v spoznavne sisteme. Podsistem prepricˇanj
nacˇela cˇezmodalnega povezovanja nekoliko prilagodi, predvsem pa nadgradi z
nekaterimi epistemicˇnimi nacˇeli za obdelavo in zdruzˇevanje vecˇagentne infor-
macije. V tem smislu je pomemben mehanizem dolocˇanja sklicevanja. Gre
za mehanizem podoben cˇezmodalnemu povezovanju, ki zdruzˇuje robotovo
lastno percepcijo elementov okolice z ustreznim opisom, ki ga poda sogov-
ornik (npr. cˇlovek). Na koncu poglavja v dani kontekst vkljucˇimo diskusijo
o nacˇinih cˇezmodalnega ucˇenja in podrobneje opiˇsemo Georgove vedenjske
mehanizme za interaktivno ucˇenje.
A.5 Eksperimenti
Nasˇ pristop k vecˇmodalnem zdruzˇevanju informacije smo ovrednotili z dvema
vrstama experimentov. Najprej smo z eksperimenti, ki simulirajo trimodalno
spoznavno arhitekturo, samostojno ovrednotili prototip mehanizma za cˇez-
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modalno povezovanje in ucˇenje. Testne naloge smo razdelili v tri skupine:
lazˇje, srednje in tezˇje. Rezultati so pokazali, kako sposobnost cˇezmodalnega
povezovanja narasˇcˇa s sˇtevilom ucˇnih primerov in kako se na tem odrazˇa
tezˇavnost testnih nalog. Nakazali so tudi nekatere specificˇne probleme metode,
ki bi jih bilo dobro obravnavati v prihodnosti. Pri tem pa gre sˇe enkrat
poudariti, da gre za samostojne eksperimente, kjer se je bil mehanizem pri-
moran odlocˇiti tudi v zelo negotovih situacijah. Cˇe bi bil del koherentnega
spoznavnega sistema, bi le-ta velikokrat v tovrstnih razmerah ravnal bolj
celostno. Lahko bi npr. prepustil odlocˇitev drugemu spoznavnemu meha-
nizmu ali sprozˇil aktivnosti za razjasnitev okoliˇscˇin, ki vkljucˇujejo vecˇ njih.
Drugi del poglavja opisuje eksperimente, ki smo jih izvedli na prototipu
robota George, s ciljem vrednotenja njegovih vedenjskih mehanizmov (pred-
vsem mehanizmov za interaktivno ucˇenje). Na ta nacˇin smo ovrednotili tudi
nasˇ pristop k vecˇmodalnem zdruzˇevanju informacij kot del delujocˇe spoz-
navne arhitekture. Eksperimenti so potekali v nadzorovanem realnem okolju,
kjer sta se robot in njegov ucˇitelj pogovarjala o predmetih v okolici po vnaprej
dolocˇenem scenariju. Robotovo obnasˇanje smo ovrednotili s primerjavo nje-
govega vedenja s pricˇakovanim vedenjem v scenariju. Rezultati so potrdili
pravilno delovanje vseh vedenjskih mehanizmov robota in s tem tudi njegovo
sposobnost interaktivnega ucˇenja. Pri tem je podsistem prepricˇanj deloval v
skladu s pricˇakovanji v vseh situacijah.
A.6 Zakljucˇek
Z rezultati eksperimentov smo torej potrdili perspektivnost nasˇega pristopa
pri premosˇcˇanju semanticˇnega prepada v spoznavnih sistemih. Velja pa
poudariti, da je George, navkljub tehnicˇni in arhitekturni kompleksnosti,
zelo preprost spoznavni sistem, kar se ticˇe njegovih sposobnosti percepcije
in vedenja. Ima zgolj eno pravo modalnost, tako da smo si morali kot
drugo modalnost ’sposoditi’ podsistem za dialog. V tem smislu bi spoznavni
sistem z vecˇ pravimi modalnostmi predstavljal dober izziv za prihodnost.
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Podobno velja za okolje z vecˇ kot enim sogovornikom. Veliko rezerv in s tem
mozˇnosti za delo v prihodnosti vidimo v formulaciji kompleksnejˇsih mod-
elov v markovskih logicˇnih omrezˇjih, pa tudi pri njihovi uporabi v drugih
spoznavnih procesih.
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